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I.

A POLICY-BASED ALTERNATIVE TO PRESENT AMERICAN LAW OF
GENETIC INFORMATION PRIVACY'

During the past generation American law has adopted what has
been called a market approach to the question of who controls personal
genetic information. But it is not a regime of laissez-faire. Instead, it
entails lawmaking whose goal is to maximize public interests, which are
increasingly equated with market efficiency. In the concrete, lawmakers
typically associate the public interest with generating and making
available the maximum amount of information, for medical researchers,
prospective employers and insurers, for governmental agencies, and
others. This view tends to see genetic information as a commodity, and
leads to the limited and sectoral protection that American law provides
for personal genetic information.
Although contemporary American law concerning the control and
uses of genetic information is the product of the Information Age, the
human quest for empowering information is not new. It is as old as the

1. At various points, this Article will use the term "privacy." It does so as a matter of
convenience, because it is a familiar term to American readers. But for both functional and
philosophical reasons this Article seeks to avoid frequent use of the term. First, as illustrated in its
very first sentence, the functional issue of this Article is who controls personal genetic information.
Next, as discussed in Part II.B.3, the concept of privacy, as commonly understood by Americans, is
linked to a concept of negative liberty that this Article finds to be an incomplete conception of
human liberty. This view is similar to that of some European lawmakers, especially those in France
and Germany, who view the scope and purpose of what they call data protection laws to encompass,
but also exceed, the bounds of what Americans normally conceive of as privacy interests. Finally,
there also exists a lively debate among scholars about whether privacy is an intermediate concept,
protecting more bedrock values (like human dignity).
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Tree of Knowledge in the Garden. 2 Even after the Fall the quest for
information that would transform the human condition retained allure for
humankind. For millennia, humans have clung to the hope that they can
reclaim power and immortality in an earthly utopia.3 Genetic science,
which began during the last half of the nineteenth century, 4 stimulated
this hope. That quest for an enhanced humanity, however, ended with a5
1I.
eugenically-justified human catastrophe during World War
Nevertheless, the early completion of the Human Genome Project,
("HGP")6 believed to provide a basis for understanding human life at its
most elemental physical level,7 has rekindled the vision 8 of advancing
human power in an earthly utopia through genetic science.
2. Genesis 3:1-6 (King James).
3. A century ago, Henri Bergson, who received a Nobel Prize in Literature, hoped that 6lan
vital would generate a creative evolution of the human race that might even conquer death.
Referring to Bergson's vision, Nobel Committee President Per Hallstrom asked: "What will it make
of us when it places at our feet all earthly power?" Kenneth W. Goodman, Wondergenes: Genetic
Enhancement and the Future of Society, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 257,257 (2004) (book review).
4. There are evidences of human awareness of influences that we now attribute to genetics
predating modem science. They include ancient Hebraic law's waiver of the requirement of
circumcision for a male infant if his brother or maternal uncle bled excessively. The eighteenthcentury French physician Maupertuis recognized that polydactyly (having more than five fingers)
was passed through generations within families.
The origin of the modem science of genetics, however, can be conveniently fixed in 1859.
Based upon experiments with successive generations of peas, in that year the Austrian monk Gregor
Mendel, published Experiments in Plant Hybridization,in CLASSIC PAPERS INGENETICS I (J. Peters
ed., 1959). Mendel's work, however, did not receive widespread scientific recognition until the
early twentieth century. Also in that year, Charles Darwin published THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES
(1859). By the mid-1860s Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton, had adapted Darwin's evolutionary
principle of survival of the fittest to human reproduction. This became known as the science of
eugenics. Galton defined the new science as a discipline "which deals with all influences that
improve the inborn qualities of a race." Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope, and Aims, 10 AM. J.
SOCIOLOGY 1 (1904). By the late nineteenth century, eugenics became a recognized science with
major political implications.
5. During the first half of the twentieth century, the eugenics movement aggressively sought
to raise humanity to a higher level by cleansing the human gene pool. The movement was strong in
the United States, and throughout the Western world, attracting adherents from all ideological
stripes. Rather than enhancing human life, however, the eugenics movement culminated with
German Nazism's extermination of groups of people it considered to be genetically inferior. See
generallyDIANE B. PAUL, CONTROLLING HUMAN HEREDITY: 1865 TO THE PRESENT (1995).

6.

For a history of the HGP, see George Cahill, A Brief History of the Human Genome

Project, in MORALITY AND THE NEW GENETICS: A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS AND HEALTH CARE

PROVIDERS (Bernard Gert et al. eds., 1996); James D. Watson, The Human Genome Project:Past,
Present, and Future, 248 SCI. 44-49 (1990); James Watson & Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan,
Commentary, The Human Genome Project andInternationalHealth, 263 JAMA 3322 (1990).
7. On June 26, 2000, when several leading scientists convened at the White House to
announce the completion of the HGP, President Clinton observed: "Today, we are learning the
language in which-Goa c'ated-life." Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary,
Remarks Made on the Completion of the First Survey of the Entire Human Genome Project (June
26, 2000), available at http://www.genome.gov/10001356. James Watson, who oversaw the HGP,
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As elaborated in Part II.A, advances in human knowledge
concerning genetics have inexorably led to a limited, sectoral legal
protection of individual control of personal genetic information. This
result reflects the fact that lawmakers, some consciously, others without
thought, have come to view personal genetic information as a
commodity. This approach is based upon the view that personal control
of genetic information is an individual value, devoid of social worth. 9
Not only that, lawmakers typically view personal control of genetic
information to be in conflict with important social values, most notably
public health interests and market efficiency. 10 The effect of this
combination of views is that lawmakers favor third-party uses of genetic
information, even when forced and sometimes surreptitious, to foster
higher and more valuable social interests. American privacy law, based
upon common law or constitutional law sources, and even in recent
federal and state legislation, provides little real legal control to citizens
over their personal genetic information.
Part II.B describes the ideology that shapes and justifies the limited
and sectoral protection that American law affords citizens over their
personal genetic information. This ideology is traceable to several
phases of the Enlightenment.1 1 From the Moderate Enlightenment,
American law has adopted the classic liberal vision of humans living in

extolled the project as providing "the ultimate tool for understanding ourselves at the molecular
level." Leon Jaroff, The Gene Hunt, TIME, Mar. 20, 1989, at 62. Because of the renewed importance
of the study of genetics, molecular biology became the life science of the twentieth century. See
Alexander Morgan Capron, Which Ills to Bear?: Reevaluating the "Threat" of Modern Genetics, 39
EMORY L.J. 665, 666 (1990).
8. Now, however, the emphasis is upon private efforts to improve health and raise the human
race. See, e.g., Gregg Easterbrook, Medical Evolution: Will Homo Sapiens Become Obsolete?, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 1, 1999, at 20. Easterbrook spends most of the article discussing the possible
benefits of stem cell research and cloning for the near future of medical science. See id.Other
authors are more visionary. See, e.g., JONATHAN GLOVER, WHAT SORT OF PEOPLE SHOULD THERE
BE? (1984); PHILIP KITCHER, THE LIVES TO COME: THE GENETIC REVOLUTION AND HUMAN
POSSIBILITIES (1996); Richard John Neuhaus, The Return of Eugenics, in GUARANTEEING THE
GOOD LIFE: MEDICINE AND THE RETURN OF EUGENICS (Richard Neuhaus ed., 1990). For more
examples, see generally ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND
JUSTICE 27 (2000); TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS 6-7 (1990); DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE
NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY (1985); PAUL, supra note 5;

Claudia Roth Pierpoint, The Measure of America: How a Rebel Anthropologist Waged War on
Racism, NEW YORKER, Mar. 8, 2004, at 48; Watson, supranote 6.
9. This view has led some to characterize the "cult of privacy" as pathological. See, e.g., H.
W. Amdt, The Cult of Privacy, 21 AUSTL. Q. 68, 70-71 (1949).
10. This way of thinking is well-described in PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY:
TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 24-42, 212-45 (1995).
11. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY
495-521 (1989) (discussing the contemporary relevance of the Enlightenment to modem identity).
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an atomistic society. In it, people pursue their own interests, and they
enjoy the liberty to think and act without outside constraints. This
version of human liberty envisions a limited role for law in society. It
acts solely as a shield protecting individuals from outside interferences
so that they can exercise a wide sphere of free thought and action.
Nevertheless, contemporary American law concerning personal
genetic information is not laissez-faire because it also draws heavily
from the utilitarianism of the Radical Enlightenment. The goal of the
utilitarian calculus is to maximize the aggregate public good. This
calculus demands regulating individual interests, conceived of as private,
for the public good. 12 Therefore, unlike classic liberaleralism,
utilitarianism embraces lawmaking (though its goal in contemporary
American lawmaking is often to foster an efficient market).
In contrast to American law's commodification of personal genetic
information, the law of the European Union (hereinafter "EU"), endows
citizens with a human right in their personal genetic information. As
described in Part III, it therefore provides a comprehensive protection,
with some important limitations, for personal control of genetic
information. For several reasons, scholars have already predicted that
American law will someday adopt a position more protective of
information privacy, similar to that of EU law. 3 Of particular
significance is the view that American law will adopt the EU's approach
because that will be necessary to maintain the smooth operation of a
growing international information market.' 4 Though this constitutes a
valuable insight concerning instrumental realities, it can as easily be
used as a basis for America to pressure the EU to reduce its level of
protection of personal control of genetic information.
Instead, Part IV, the culminating section of the paper, elaborates a
policy basis for American lawmakers to endow citizens with a human
right in their genetic information. This proposal begins with the
perception, elaborated in Part IV.A, that citizens of modernized societies

12.

See

THOMAS BEAUCHAMP & LEROY WALTERS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 1N BIOETHICS 13

(1982).

13.

One view is that the present American law of information privacy is a way-station, a

phase of an evolutionary process that will inevitably lead to greater legal protection of personal
information privacy. See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU
and InternationalRules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 80

(2000).
14. Because the law of the EU affords greater protection to personal genetic information than
does American law, EU law will often not countenance exchanges of genetic information with the
United States. See id; European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L.
281).
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are peculiarly weak and vulnerable to harm from powerful outside
forces. In existing literature their vulnerability is typically attributed to
scientific and technological developments. 15 Scientific knowledge of
human genetic information is increasing rapidly, and scientists can easily
obtain the genetic information of individuals from blood samples or even
a lock of hair. The development of computer technology allows the
storage of huge swaths of genetic data, and more recent internet
technology facilitates its instantaneous transfer to anywhere in the world.
It should not be forgotten, however, that these developments of
science and technology are part of a larger and historically much older
process of modernization that has in a number of important ways
rendered individuals weak and vulnerable. The most important of these
is by separating them from traditional communities and communal
bonds. Also of importance is the rise of powerful nation states during the
early modern period, and then much later, attendant to the Industrial
Revolution, the rise of efficient governmental bureaucracies. The
Industrial Revolution also spawned "private" corporate entities wielding
unprecedented power in efficient ways over weak and isolated
individuals and groups. The holocaust during World War II provides an
ominous historical warning of what can happen to groups stigmatized
based upon their genetic makeup. Whatever the amount of power that
the Nazi regime could wield in Germany, the development of modern
technology exponentially enhances the efficiency and power of both
governmental bureaucracies and corporate
enterprises relative to persons
16
and groups in the contemporary world.
The cumulative impact of all of these forces is to make it important
for contemporary law to empower citizens so that they can begin to
regain some of their lost independence. One of the important ways that
law can do this is to endow citizens with a human right in their genetic
information. This is because of the special history and public perceptions
of genetic information. Admittedly there are other forms of sensitive
medical information.' 7 It is also difficult to isolate genetic information

15. This parallels the original basis for the formation of the American law of privacy based
upon the landmark law review article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). Their article constituted a reaction to intrusions upon privacy
by recent developments in photography and communications. See generally id
16. These various strands of human history suggest rejecting the view that a reduction of
personal control over one's genetic information would lessen human vulnerability. See also Richard
A. Wasserstrom, Privacy:Some Arguments and Assumptions, in PHILOSOPHICAL LAW: AUTHORITY,
EQUALITY, ADJUDICATION, PRIVACY (Richard Bronaugh ed., 1978).

17. One example is a blood sample.
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from some other forms of human materials. 18 Nor is all genetic
information highly informative and sensitive. 19 Nevertheless, it remains
indisputable that the history of use of genetic information is exceptional.
The dreadful history of the eugenics movement in western civilization
during the first half of the twentieth century creates a cultural context
that lawmakers can only ignore at their peril. 20 Further, the public, and
many scientists, entertain peculiarly high expectations for the potential
contributions of genetic engineering to human health and capabilities .2
A related public perception, of great significance for this paper, is the
view that people are genetically hard-wired.22 Though we are learning
increasingly that this is not the case,23 the public perception is a reality
18. This is because of the immaterial nature of genes. Genes are not DNA molecules. DNA
molecules are based upon what one's mother ate while she was pregnant, and what one eats after
birth. See Lee M. Silver, The Meaning of Genes and "Genetic Rights," 40 JURIMETRICS J. 9, 11
(1999). In contrast, a "gene is a[n immaterial] packet of information encoded within the DNA
molecule." Id. Professor Silver compares the nature of genes to the configuration of computers:
Just as the magnetic surface of a disk can act as the storage medium for a computer file,
the DNA molecule acts as the storage medium for a genetic file, or gene. And, just as a
file can be transferred from one magnetic disk to another without the actual exchange of
matter, so a gene can be copied from one DNA molecule to another, even as the new
DNA molecule is built up entirely from raw materials-brand new atoms, "pulled out of
the air."
Id.
Further, there is no reason in the practice of medicine or medical research to make a clear
distinction between genetic and non-genetic materials. For centuries, doctors have made use of
genetic data, without recognizing it as such, by paying attention to family health histories in treating
patients. In scientific medical research, often genetic and non-genetic materials are mixed together
into the biological sample, which is the basic unit for such research. See Henriette D.C. Roscam
Abbing, Introduction, UNESCO's International Declaration of Human Rights, II EUR. J. OF
HEALTH L. 93 (2004).
19. Over 99% of genetic materials are shared by homo sapiens. See Silver, supra note 18, at
13. Further, in the less than 1% of genetic information that is not universally shared, the differences
in individual genes are very small. See id These alterations are called alleles, and they typically
vary only slightly from the usual gene, as by a single unit called a base (analogous to a bit, among
hundreds of thousands of bytes, in a computer). See id Given the size of the human population, it is
unlikely that any single human being has a unique allele. See id. It is rather unique combinations of
alleles that help to explain differences among persons. See id. It is true, however, that the small
variations in human genes can sometimes have dramatic consequences for human health. See id.
20. This recalls the old maxim that those who ignore history are doomed to repeat its failures
(and tragedies).
21. See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text.
22. An interesting anecdote illustrating how genetic determinism has penetrated popular
culture is given by Professor Silver. In 1996 he heard the following conversation among friends in
the tiny village of Zonza, isolated between mountain ranges in the middle of the island of Corsica in
the Mediterranean Sea. One man was making the others laugh with his stories, and a woman in the
group asked how it was that he was so funny. He instantly replied, "C'est genetiquel." See Silver,
supra note 18, at 10.
23. Science has been accumulating data suggesting that the linkages between genetics and
diseases, for example, vary greatly. Alzheimer's disease is interesting as an example. A small
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that can, and has, lead to the stigmatization of individuals and ethnic
groups.
The view that human beings are genetically hard-wired suggests
another reason why it is important today to endow citizens with a human
right in their genetic information. Based upon the experience of World
War II, state-based eugenics is out of favor in most parts of the world
today. Nevertheless, Part IV.A notes that private eugenic efforts, with
little notice, have resurfaced, exerting pressures upon women and
couples in making decisions concerning reproduction, as well
as raising
24
again the possibility of stigmatizing individuals and groups.
Part IV.B concludes this Article by turning to home-grown
ideological sources, alternative to those that presently shape America's
law of genetic information privacy, that provide a justification for
lawmakers to endow citizens with a human right in their genetic
information. These sources include: the founding fathers, most
especially the thinking of Thomas Jefferson and his concern for the wide
availability of land to all citizens; the Romantic reform movement of the
Jacksonian period of American history, especially Horace Mann's
advocacy for universal public education; and finally, Progressive
thought and the jurisprudence of Legal Realism that continued to support
the availability of public education, as well as a new approach to
contract law and governmental welfare benefits.
All of these thinkers were concerned with a loss of human
independence. All of them also firmly believed that in modernizing
communities human empowerment was necessary to resurrect the
independence and dignity of each and every citizen. The independence
of citizens was essential not only for individuals to realize their unique
human potential, but also because an independent and diverse citizenry
was the irreplaceable cornerstone of genuinely democratic communities.
number of persons who contract this disease, less than 1%, have genetic mutations that make it
almost certain that they will contract the disease. Almost one-half of the persons who contract
Alzheimer's have a genetic predisposition that raises their vulnerability to contracting it by from
30% to 60% percent. But many people who suffer from Alzheimer's have no known genetic basis
for their disease. Thus, "Alzheimer's disease is a strongly genetic, weakly genetic, and apparently
non-genetic disease-all at the same time." Henry T. Greely, Iceland's Plan for Genomics
Research: Facts and Implications, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 153, 156 (2000) (relying upon results
published by Sara L. Tobin et al., The Genetics of Alzheimer Disease and the Application of
Molecular Tests, 3 GENETIC TESTING 37 (1999)). Further, recent scientific research suggests that
environmental factors far outweigh genetics as a causative force in people who are afflicted with
cancer (suggesting that genetics is a significant causative element in only about 5% of cancer cases).
See David L. Eaton, Scientific Judgment and Toxic Torts-A Primer in Toxicology for Judges and
Lawyers, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 5, 23-29 (2003).
24. See DUSTER, supra note 8, at 37-57.
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In contrast to present American lawmaking, the thrust of this ideology
would be to view endowing citizens with a human right in their genetic
information to constitute not only an individual value, but also a social
value of inestimable worth.
1I.

HOW AMERICAN LAW AND LEGAL IDEOLOGY COMMODIFY
GENETIC INFORMATION

A.

American Law's Limited and Sectoral Protectionof Genetic
Information Privacy

1. The Development of American Law and Medical Ethics
American law did not always view genetic information as a
commodity. To the contrary, both traditional law and medical ethics
strongly discouraged disclosures of all personal health information,
including genetic information. This section will trace how American
law, and medical ethics evolved to a position encouraging disclosures,
even sometimes surreptitiously or without consent, of personal genetic
information.
The oldest surviving example of information privacy in Western
civilization is the physicians' duty of confidentiality concerning
everything they learned about their patients. This duty was formulated in
the fifth century B.C. by the Hippocratic Oath, and its influence
continued to prevail among physicians of the Western world into the
modem period. The physicians' duty of confidentiality was so strict
that it seemed to conceive of a patient's medical information as part of
the person. During the latter eighteenth century English courts of
common law imposed a duty of confidentiality upon doctors concerning
information they learned about their patients.2 6
The duty of confidentiality that doctors owed to their patients was
consistent with a personal service model of medicine. Pursuant to it,
25. By affirming the Hippocratic Oath the physician promised: "[W]hatsoever I shall see or
hear in the course of my profession, as well as outside my profession in my intercourse with men, if
it be what should not be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things shameful to be
holy secret." Robert M. Gellman, PrescribingPrivacy: The UncertainRole of the Physician in the
Protectionof Patient Privacy,62 N.C. L. REV. 255, 267-68 (1984) (quoting 1 HIPPOCRATES 164-65
(W. Jones trans. 1923), reprintedin ETHICS INMEDICINE 5 (S. Reiser et al. eds., 1977)).
26. The common law first clearly adopted the confidentiality principle for doctors only in
1776, in Rex v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. State Tr. 355, 572-73 (1776). See Daniel W. Shuman,
The Origins of the Physician-PatientPrivilege and Professional Secret, 39 Sw. L.J. 661, 671-72
(1985).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1241

doctors were to focus their efforts upon the care of their patients without
regard for public health concerns.2 7 The personal service model of
medical care converged with basic principles of classical common law
that would fundamentally shape what would become tort and contract
law. It held that persons who do not voluntarily take on duties to other
persons, including to warn them of harms, by entering into contract
privity had no legal duty to protect them from harm. 8 The common
law's no-affirmative-duty principle was reinforced during the nineteenth
century by a radical individualism that viewed contract as the almost
exclusive way that persons took on legal duties to one another. 29 All of
these themes of common law reinforced the physician's duty, now legal
as well as ethical, to maintain the confidentiality of all medical
information.
During the twentieth century, this framework of traditional law and
medical ethics, though not dismantled, nevertheless experienced
substantial alteration. To Progressive thinkers, protecting public health
interests became imperative in the now highly industrialized and
urbanized American society in which many people lived crowded
together. The primary methodology for protecting public health was
what became known as public health utilitarianism. A fundamental
analysis is an uncompromising
characteristic of utilitarian
consequentialism, or teleology (telos means end). The utilitarian calculus
seeks to maximize the balance of values over disvalues relative to
desired public ends.30 Since one of the goals of Progressive lawmakers
was to maximize public health interests, they now began to require
disclosures, even when they might be involuntary, of medical
information that would assist public health officials in preventing the
spread of diseases.3 1

27.
28.

See BUCHANAN ET AL. supra note 8, at 1-26.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).

29. Many works could be cited for this proposition, but perhaps the most useful, even though
it addresses English rather than American legal history, is P.S. AT1YAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 226, 256 (1979).

It was also consistent with traditional common law's lawmaking process, which, at least in
theory, focused upon the interests of parties involved in particular cases without any regard for
larger concerns of public policy. An interesting latter-day articulation of this approach to
lawmaking, though its decision deviates from the stated theory, is by the New York Court of
Appeals. See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 877 (1970).
30. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 11. Excellent reviews of utilitarian philosophy are
found in BEAUCHAMP & WALTERS, supra note 12; UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (Amartya Sen &
Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
31.

See Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (Minn. 1919). Later examples of courts

addressing the applicability of the duty to warn family members of infectious diseases include
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Reflecting the influence of public health utilitarianism, by the early
twentieth century formulations of the Code of Ethics published by the
American Medical Association began to carve out exceptions to the
traditional strict duty of physician confidentiality of the Hippocratic
Oath.32 Twentieth-Century law, both statutory and common law, traveled
a parallel course with medical ethics. Courts, influenced by public health
utilitarianism, began to impose a duty upon doctors and other health
officials to warn the public of contagious diseases. Over the course of
the twentieth century, state legislatures passed an array of public health
statutes that required health care providers to disclose a variety of
maladies, notably including infectious diseases and a number of sexually
transmitted diseases.33
Even today, the no-affirmative-duty rule remains as a general
principle of the common law, it came under sharp criticism from legal
34
scholars as justifying "morally outrageous and indefensible conduct."

Britton v. Soltes, 563 N.E.2d 910, 913 (1990) (finding no duty to warn); and Wojcik v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 183 N.Y.S.2d 351, 357 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (finding a duty to warn). But see Britton v.
Soltes, 563 N.E.2d 910 (1990).
32. In 1912, for the first time the Code of Medical Ethics of the AMA required doctors to
disclose medical information "to protect a healthy individual from becoming infected" with "a
communicable disease." Gellman, supra note 25, at 269. In 1957 the AMA's Ninth Principle of
Medical Ethics directed doctors to disclose patient information when "it becomes necessary in order
to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community." Id. By 1980 the AMA's Principles of
Ethics stated that doctors were "to safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of the law."
Id. at 270.
Almost all contemporary ethical formulations permit health care providers, without the
consent of patients, to disseminate genetic information to family and relatives when they believe
that the benefits to society of disclosures outweigh their harms. See, e.g., INST. OF MED. COMM. ON
ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, ASSESSING GENETIC RISK: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL
et
al.
eds.,
1994),
available
at
POLICY
267
(Lori
B.
Andrews
http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309047986/html; N.Y. TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW,
GENETIC TESTING AND SCREENING IN THE AGE OF GENOMIC MEDICINE 274 (2000), available at
http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/taskfce/screening.htm; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND
COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC SCREENING, COUNSELING, AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS 44 (1983); Am.
Soc'y of Human Genetics, Soc. Issues Subcomm. on Familial Disclosure, ProfessionalDisclosure
of Familial Genetic Information, 62 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 474, 475 (1998), available at
http://genetics.faseb.org/genetics/ashg/pubs/policy/pol-29.htm.
Although I have never seen this connection made in literature, it is interesting that this
major shift in medical ethics coincided with the rising influence of eugenics in America. Indeed, the
first of the state sterilization laws, founded upon eugenics, was also adopted in 1912. See infra Part
II.B.2.
33. BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW (2d ed. 2000), §§ 4-34(a)-(d).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965). As early as 1908 the renowned
tort law scholar Francis Bohlen criticized the rule as incommensurate with the values of
interdependence and maintaining community bonds. See generally Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1241

Reflecting the impact of such criticism during the last forty years of the
twentieth century, courts began to recognize affirmative legal duties
owed to certain classes of persons not in contract privity. One of these
classes of persons upon whom law has imposed duties to warn of
dangers are those who had a "special relation" with either endangered
persons or to third parties who might be harmed by persons under their
control.3 5 Developing law also imposed a duty to warn upon persons
who undertook "services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of a third person," and who could suffer
harm "because of the reliance36of the other ...or of the third person
himself, upon his undertaking.
Utilitarian analysis has been important in both shaping and
justifying the new legal duties to warn. This is illustrated by a series of
cases decided by the California Supreme Court that became landmarks
in developing this new structure of the law of tort duty. In its weighing
of factors to determine whether to find a duty to warn, the California
Supreme Court continued to consider traditional and individualistic
moral considerations.3 7 But the influence of utilitarianism was also clear
when the court explicitly considered the "consequences to the
community of imposing a duty" as one of its factors.38
The most famous duty to warn decision of the California Supreme
Court was delivered in 1976 in Tarasoffv. Regents of The University of
California.39 The court held that a psychiatrist had a legal duty to warn
the former girlfriend of a patient who expressed to the doctor an intent to
kill her. The court deduced the legal duty to warn the former girlfriend
from the special relationship the doctor had with his patient. Judge
Tobringer's opinion in Tarasoffalso explicitly linked the finding of an

Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908). More recently, Leslie

Bender argued that the no-duty-to assist rule reflects the dominance of male values in the common
law of torts. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 33-36 (1988).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). Section 315 establishes an affirmative

duty owing to persons outside of contract privity who are threatened with physical harms and who
have special relationships with the party having the duty to warn family members of their patients.
Subsection (b) extends the duty to warn when, "a special relation exists between the actor and the
other which gives to the other a right to protection." Id.
36. Id. at § 324A and cmt. e (emphasis added).
37. For example, in drawing the scope of duty, judges were to consider "the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct." Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).

38. Id. The traditional foreseeability of harm test for defining scope of duty, which continues
to be important today, can encompass both individual and public concerns.
39.

551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
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affirmative tort duty to warn upon a utilitarian calculus protective of
public safety. He observed:
Our current crowded and computerized society compels the
interdependence of its members. In this risk-infested society we can
hardly tolerate the further exposure to danger that would result from a
concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient was lethal.4 o
This framework of legal analysis has been applied by a number of
recent decisions to impose a duty upon doctors to warn family members
of dangers based upon knowledge they gained from treating patients. An
important example is a Tennessee decision in 1993. Citing infectious
disease cases, section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965),
and Tarasoff as precedents, the court required a doctor, when a patient
died of Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, to warn family members of this
danger because the insects that cause this disease cluster.41
Several recent cases also impose legal duties upon doctors to
disclose genetic defects they discover while treating patients. In 1996, a
New Jersey court imposed upon a doctor a duty to warn the child of his
patient of her father's genetic predisposition. 42 Between 1956-1964 the
defendant, Dr. Pack, treated the plaintiffs father for colon cancer. The
plaintiff, Donna Safer, contracted the same disease in 1990. Her multiple
polyposis required that she undergo extensive medical treatment.4 3 In
1991, Mrs. Safer obtained her father's medical records, and based upon
them she filed a negligence claim against the estate of the now-deceased
Dr. Pack. It alleged that because her father's condition was hereditary,
and it becomes metastatic colon-rectal cancer if left untreated, Dr. Pack
had a duty to warn Safer concerning her genetic predisposition. Early
warning would have allowed for timely monitoring and treatment of her
cancer. The trial court rendered summary judgment for the defendant.
But the Superior Court, in an opinion written by Judge Kestin, reversed,
and in remanding the case for retrial suggested that there were cases in
which doctors have a duty to warn family and relatives of their patients'
genetic predispositions. The trial court judge in Safer had distinguished
cases of genetic defects from those where doctors have a duty to warn of
contagious diseases. From a public health perspective, however, Judge
40. Id. at 347.
41. See Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 871 (Tenn. 1993). One of the infectious disease
cases cited by the court was Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1959).
42. See Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
43. She had to undergo a total abdominal colectomy with ileorectal anastamosis. She then had
to have her left ovary removed, and undergo chemotherapy. See id. at 1190.
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Kestin analogized the cases, observing that both groups at risk (of
contagious or genetic diseases) are easily identifiable, and in both cases
substantial harms can 44be averted by timely warning and monitoring of
the dangers they pose.
Another notable case concerning a doctor's duty to warn their
patients of genetic defects is the Florida Supreme Court's decision in
Pate v. Threlkel.45 Decided in 1995, just one year before the New Jersey
Superior Court's decision in Safer, its fact pattern and legal issue are
exactly the same as in that case. In language that resonates of the legal
analysis of the California Supreme Court in Tarasoff, the Florida court
held that a doctor has a duty to warn of the genetic defect, though it
suggested that the duty could be fulfilled by warning the patient.46
As a lot, the genetic defect cases, as well as the Rocky Mountain
Spotted Fever case, all seem to rely upon the concept of special
relationship as a basis for imposing upon a physician a duty to warn.
There are also cases, notably involving contagious diseases, in which
courts adopt the concept of reliance, as articulated in section 324A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), as the basis for imposing a duty
to warn.47
The preeminent example, however, of how the utilitarian calculus
has led recent American lawmakers to commodify personal genetic
information is the decision of the California Supreme Court in Moore v.
Regents of the University of California.48 The defendant, Dr. David
Golde, diagnosed Moore, the plaintiff, as suffering from hairy-cell
leukemia, and he recommended the extraction of Moore's spleen. Dr.
Golde had Moore come back periodically, presumably for monitoring of
his health, at which times he extracted blood serum, bone marrow
asperate, sperm, and other bodily materials from him. Covertly, Dr.
Golde and an associate, Dr. Shirley Quan, were working on Moore's
body parts to patent a cell line. When Moore discovered the deception he
filed a lawsuit alleging a bevy of claims seeking to recover royalties for
44. Judge Kestin cited Tarasoffand sections 314 and 314A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, as legal precedents for his decision. See id. at 1192. To my knowledge, Judge Kestin's ruling
was never implemented. The case was tied up in the New Jersey courts for a number of years in
litigation over procedural issues, and also limited by later New Jersey legislation.
45. 661 So. 2d278 (Fla. 1995).
46. See id. at 280, 282.
47. For example, in DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc., the court found that
when a doctor treated a person possibly infected with hepatitis, the doctor had a duty to warn her
that she could transfer the virus through sexual contact. See 583 A.2d 422, 423-24 (Pa. 1990); see
also Reisner v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(requiring a doctor to inform a patient of the dangers posed by the HIV virus).
48. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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the use of his genetic information and bodily substances. In granting a
recovery the California Court of Appeals in Judge Rothman's majority
opinion, upheld Moore's conversion claim. 49 But on appeal, the
California Supreme Court dismissed most of his actions, including the
conversion claim. The opinion of the Supreme Court, as well as Judge
George's dissent to the Court of Appeals decision, are models of
utilitarian analysis. They find the value to human health of the patented
cell line to the public, as well as its commercial value, to outweigh the
violation of Moore's personal autonomy (by fraudulent means). 50 The
utilitarian analysis employed by the California courts in the Moore cases
seeks to meld public health interests with maximizing market efficiency
in connection with the developing and marketing of a new and very
lucrative medical product.5 1
A clearer example of the commodification of genetic information is
provided by the agreement that the government of Iceland consummated
with a private scientific research corporation, DeCode Genetics. In 2000,
DeCode negotiated a twelve-year license from the government of
Iceland for what is called the Islandic Health Care Database. The
Database includes: extensive genotypes; genealogical information for
the past three centuries; and an array of information on the health and
diseases of the persons whose genetic and genealogical information is
included. DeCode is using this information to develop new treatments
for diseases, and it has already made some very lucrative contracts with
pharmaceutical companies for these anticipated products. Icelanders52who
out of it.
wish not to be part of this Database must file a form to opt
The emphasis of contemporary law on market efficiency has led
some scholars, as well as some leaders of the business community, to
call for a return to contract as the way to determine the control and uses
of all personal information, including genetic information.5 3 The contract
approach has already had some application to the international flow of
49. 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 502 (Ct. App. 1988).
50. For example, Judge George stated that "the vital competing interests of the patient, the
health care provider, the commercial research laboratory, and the public at large" balanced out in
favor of denying protection for a property interest in a "human bodily substance for research and
commercial use." Id. at 540.
51. The cell line that Drs. Gould and Quan patented would have an estimated worth of three
billion dollars. See Michael M.J. Lin, Conferring a Federal Property Right in Genetic Material:
Stepping into the Future with the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 113 (1996).

52. See Greely, supranote 23, at 162-69.
53. For an example of this proposal in academic literature, see Steven A. Bibas, A
ContrtactualAppraoch to Data Privacy, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591, 605-11 (1994). Gregory

Shaffer discusses the growing support for this approach, especially with regard to the international
flow of personal information. See Shaffer, supranote 13.
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personal information, and if it is to be used at all, it seems best suited to
that environment.54
By the mid-1990s, then, a substantial body of statutory and case
law permitted or required involuntary disclosures and appropriations of
personal genetic information. But just as this body of law was cresting a
counter-wave of legislation, both federal and state, intended to limit
disclosures of personal health information, including genetic
information, began to form.
2. The Recent Wave of Health Information Privacy Legislation
Beginning during the mid-1990s there emerged a wave of
lawmaking emphasizing personal control of health, and especially
genetic, information.5 5 Some recent state and federal court decisions
have held disclosures of medical information to breach the physician's
or health care institution's duty of confidentiality,5 6 or the patient's
federal or state constitutional right of privacy. 7 But by far the most
important legal source protecting personal control of genetic information
in contemporary American law is statutory law, both federal and state.

54. See generally Shaffer, supra note 13. In domestic law, the contract approach would
disadvantage poor persons with weak bargaining power. In the international setting, governmental
and corporate entities are the parties to these contracts. It should not be forgotten, however, that
these international contracts often involve the personal information of everyday citizens.
55. A review of much of the law discussed in this section can be found in JOY PRITrS ET AL.,
THE STATE OF HEALTH PRIVACY: AN UNEVEN TERRAIN: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF STATE
HEALTH PRIVACY STATUTES (1999), available at http://141.16140.13 l/-jonesd3/statereport.pdf. In
addition to Georgetown University's Health Privacy Project website, there is also one operated by
the Center for Health Studies at St. Louis University that posts privacy law information. See Center
for Health Law, http://law.slu.edu/healthlaw/research/links/hipaa.html.
56. See, e.g., Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523-24 (Ohio 1999); Doe v.
Cmty. Health Plan-Kaiser Corp., 709 N.Y.S.2d 215 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2000). In Doe, the
New York court held that although there was no statutory basis for a private right of action, a duty
not to disclose confidential information arises from the physician-patient relationship, and a breach
is actionable as a tort. See Doe, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 217-18.
57. Two recent cases rely upon constitutional provisions that relate to personal privacy rights
to provide some limitations upon non-consensual testing for, and then use or dissemination of,
personal medical information. See Hill v. Evans, No. 91-A-626-N, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19878, at
*30-43 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 7, 1993) (relying upon the Fourth Amendment's prohibition upon illegal
searches and seizures to afford some protection against non-consensual testing for HIV although
finding testing pursuant to implied consent reasonable under a special needs analysis due to the need
to protect health care personnel); see also Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d
1260, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1998) (limiting an employer's testing of employees for various diseases,
including sickle-cell anemia and venereal diseases, as well as for pregnancy, based upon federal
constitutional search and seizure and the Fourteenth Amendment due process rights associated with
personal privacy, as well as a state constitutional privacy right). The Ninth Circuit's opinion,
however, explicitly recognized a balancing of employer's and its employees' interests in defining
the scope of the employees' privacy rights. See id.
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Occasionally statutes will confer a property right upon persons in their
genetic information, but most endow persons with a privacy right.
In 1996 Congress adopted the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act ("HIPAA"). Both HIPAA, and a Health and Human
Service ("HHS") regulation concerning the privacy of medical
information published pursuant to it in 200058 restrict disclosure of
"protected health information," including genetic information. The law
broadly covers health care providers. 59 The general structure of HIPAA
and its HHS regulations also favor the privacy of medical information.
They prohibit the disclosure of medical information unless the law
specifically allows for it, and permits disclosures only of the minimum
necessary information.
Nevertheless, five major features of HIPAA demonstrate that it
affords little real legal protection against the non-consensual acquisition
and dissemination of genetic information. First, health information
privacy is just one, and not the main, purpose of HIPAA. Indeed, one of
the primary goals of HIPAA, to mandate the collection and storing of all
medical information electronically, facilitates the ready circulation of
medical information. Second, though the original HHS regulation
required that health care providers obtain written consent from patients
before disseminating medical information gathered for the purposes of
treating or billing them, the general rule of the present HHS regulation is
that health care providers do not have to obtain a patient's consent for
uses and disclosures of information related to treatment, payment, and
health care operations. 60 Third, HIPAA does not address the issue of the
non-consensual collection of medical information at all.6 1 Fourth,
HIPAA does not cover all medical websites, nor does it cover medical
58.

Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (1996)). It includes

genetic testing, family medical history, and genetic counseling, but it does not cover blood or tissue
from which genetic information is derived. See id.
59. It includes doctors, hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, all sorts of health and insurance plans,
health maintenance organizations, and health care clearinghouses. Many websites that provide
medical care are operated by one of these organizations. However, websites not operated by one of
these organizations will not be covered by HIPAA unless they electronically transmit health
information. See id.
60. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a) (2003), which makes obtaining consent optional. Section
164.508 lists instances in which health care providers must obtain authorization for various uses and
disclosures of personal medical information. See id. Senator Kennedy has vowed to introduce
legislation reinstating the original HHS requirement of written consent for the disclosure of this
information. See supranote 58.
61. Some federal law does protect against the non-consensual collection of medical
information but only in the employment setting. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d 1260. But as
already noted, it does not afford prospective employees absolute rights, and it does not explicitly
mention genetic information.
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information once it is in the hands of those other than health care
providers. Finally, although HIPAA allows patients to access their
medical records, and to trace who else has had access to them, it does
not provide a private right of action for breaches of its privacy
provisions.
Congress continues to be interested in health information privacy.
Since the adoption of HIPAA, numerous health privacy bills have been
introduced for congressional consideration.62 While many of these bills
focus upon disclosures of medical information to insurance companies
and employers, some have a broader scope.6 3 The Genetic Privacy Act
provides for an elaborate procedure assuring that only those who obtain
consent can have access to a person's genetic information. 64 But none of
these proposals have been enacted, and the ultimate result of
congressional consideration of the privacy of health information remains
conjectural.65
Congress intended HIPAA merely to set a floor of medical
information privacy, and thus to allow states to pass more rigorous
privacy laws. 66 Since the mid-1990s, legislatures in about half of

America's states have passed statutes restricting the dissemination of
genetic information. This body of state statutes presently constitutes the
most important source of American law protecting personal control of
health information. As with Congress, state legislatures are constantly
health
reviewing proposals for regulating the control of personal
67
information.
genetic
concerns
it
of
much
and
information,

62.

In the year following the adoption of HIPAA, in the 105th Congress, five health privacy

bills were introduced for Congress to consider. In the 106th Congress alone nine bills were
introduced dealing exclusively with health information privacy. Eight other bills introduced in that
Congress had provisions relating to health information privacy. See The Health Privacy Project,
http://www.healthprivacy.org. These bills have both Republican and Democratic sponsors. See id.
63. Representative Greenwood of Pennsylvania broadly prohibited health care providers from
non-consensual disclosures of "health information regarding an individual" including disclosures to
family and relatives. The Medical Information Protection and Research Enhancement Act of 1999,
H.R. 1215, 106th Cong. § 204 (1999).

64. The Act prohibits the collection of "an individually identifiable DNA sample for genetic
analysis without the written authorization of the sample source .... . Genetic Privacy Act §§ 101 (a)103

(1995),

available

at

http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/

HumanGenome/resource/privacy/privacy2.html. The written authorization must satisfy certain
technical requirements to be legally valid. See id.
65. Congress did not meet its 1999 deadline for the passage of further health information
privacy legislation. See PRITTS ET AL., supra note 55.

66. Some states have passed statutes aimed at building upon HIPAA. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181 (2004).
67. See PRJTTS ET AL., supra note 55.
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Themes of the new law protecting personal control of personal
health information are not easy to synthesize. The body of potentially
relevant state legislation is growing rapidly, and is diffused.6 8 In addition
to statutes explicitly considering control of genetic information, there
are, for example, some medical licensing statutes that address the issue.69
There is a regional flavor to health privacy statutes, the legislatures of
70
southern states having adopted a disproportionate number of them.
Nevertheless, these health care privacy statutes are widespread
geographically. For example, New Jersey published one that limits the
impact of the Safer decision. 7 1 Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and California
have published the most encompassing statutes regulating the72privacy of
personal medical information, including genetic information.
Despite the wide variations in state statutes protecting personal
control of health information, a number of general themes emerge
concerning their regulation of the dissemination of genetic information.
First, a privacy right is the predominant justification offered by these
statutes for restricting disclosures of genetic information. 73 Next, while
many of these statutes concern the disclosure of health, and especially
genetic, information to insurance companies or employers, some contain
68. The most thorough study of state privacy laws concludes:
Law relating to health privacy can be found in nearly every nook and cranny of a state's
statutes [and] in obvious and obscure sections of a state's code, buried in regulations,
developed in case law, and detailed in licensing rules. Florida, for example, has more
than 60 statutes that address health privacy, and it is not unique.
Id. at 8. Massachusetts departs from this norm in conferring upon citizens a general "right against
[an] unreasonable, substantial or serious interference" with their privacy. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
214, § lB (2005). But even it has a number of statutes that relate to specific medical health
information issues.
69. One example is licensing legislation that punishes health care providers who nonconsensually disseminate medical information. Florida law mandates that health care providers who
violate privacy provisions shall be disciplined by appropriate licensing authorities. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 456.057(14) (West 2005) (formerly § 445.667).
70. For example, Georgia provides heightened protection to genetic information whereas it
may be released only to the persons tested and only to others with the consent of the tested persons.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-3 (2004). Maryland has a similar law. See MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 27909 (2004). South Carolina's statute declares that all genetic information is confidential and, except
for a few cases, can only be disclosed with the written consent of the patient. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 38-93-30 (West 2004).
71. See Natalie Anne Stepanuk, Comment, Genetic Information and Third Party Access to
Information: New Jersey's Pioneering Legislation as a Model for Federal Privacy Protection of
Genetic Information, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1105, 1128 (1998).
72. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.37 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. §§ 146.83,610.70 (2004); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 5-37-22 (2005).
73. For example, both Georgia's and Colorado's statutes succinctly state that one of their
purposes is "[t]o protect individual privacy and to preserve individual autonomy." COLO. REV.
STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(c) (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-54-11 (2004) (formerly § 33-54-1).
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language broad enough to prohibit the non-consensual dissemination of
genetic information to family and relatives. Whatever the scope of such
statutes, almost all of them provide for numerous exceptions to their
general rule of personal control over genetic information. For example,
the focus of this legislation continues to be the uses and disseminations
of personal health information, not upon its collection. Even the
regulation of the dissemination of personal health information is often
incomplete, for many of the statutes only concern the first disclosure of
the information, and do not regulate its further distribution.7 4 The
remedies for violations of medical information privacy in these statutes
also vary.75
The most important characteristic of this recent wave of law is that
it is fragmented and sectoral. The Georgetown University study tracking
the development of this law concluded that "with a few notable
exceptions," recent state statutes "do not extend comprehensive
protection to people's medical records., 76 More pointedly, Lori B.
Andrews observed "[ilt is shocking how little protection exists for
private medical information. 7 7 As we will now see, neither American
common law nor constitutional law of privacy measurably ameliorates
the limited and sectoral protection that American law affords to control
over personal genetic information.
3. Common and Constitutional Law and Genetic Information
Privacy
The limitations of the recent wave of health privacy legislation are
not cured by existing privacy law in America, in either its common law
or constitutional forms. Like the recent statute law, common law affords
sectoral protection to personal health information. For a number of
reasons, federal constitutional law presently affords virtually no
protection for personal control of genetic information, and the protection
afforded it by state constitutional law varies.

74.

See PRITrS ET AL., supra note 55, at 82.

75. Some provide for criminal sanctions. New Jersey provides for fines, imprisonment, or
both for violations of health information privacy. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-49 (2005); see also OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3729.46 (repealed 2001), 3729.99, 2921.21 (West 2005). New Mexico provides
for both the Attorney General and persons whose genetic information is violated to file civil claims.
Victims may obtain both equitable remedies and damages, reasonable attorney fees, and court costs.
For violations that are grossly negligent or willful, victims may recover up to $5,000 in addition to
economic loss. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-6 (Michie 2004).
76. PRITTS ET AL., supra note 55, at 9.
77.

LORI B. ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT: CONFRONTING DECISIONS ABOUT GENETICS 141

(2001).
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As it has developed in the twentieth century, the common law does
not protect a generalized privacy interest, but only four discreet privacy
interests.78 Although these interests focus upon informational privacy,79
and arguably three of the four could be adapted to protect personal
control of genetic information,80 no court has yet applied any of them to
personal health information. 81
American federal constitutional law concerning personal privacy is
circumscribed in a number of important ways.8 2 Of particular

78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2) (1977). See generally William L. Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960). Edward J. Bloustein unsuccessfully protested that Prosser's
formulation subverted Warren and Brandeis's original intent for the law of privacy, while arguing
that a generalized concept of privacy protected human dignity. Privacy as an Aspect of Human
Dignity. An Answer to Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1964).
79. This focus reflects the influence of Warren's and Brandeis's law review article, supra
note 15, upon the development of the common law of privacy in American law. Though it is widely
believed that Brandeis was the primary author of the article, the impulse to write the article came
from Warren's smarting over what he considered to be intrusive publicity of his daughter's
wedding. See Prosser, supra note 78, at 383.
80. These include the right against intrusion upon one's seclusion, public disclosure of
embarrassing information, and publicity placing individuals in a false light.
81. In addition to the limitations in the general structure of the common law of privacy in
America, there are several specific reasons of legal doctrine for this result. First, privacy violations
require that the intruder act unreasonably. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652A(2) (1977).
Further, in a notable Oregon decision the court held that an actionable invasion of one's seclusion
requires an affirmative act of prying, not just a doctor disclosure of information in response to a
request for it. See Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527, 532 (Or. 1985).
82. To begin, because of the privacy right's connections to substantive due process, the
specter of Lochner v. New York, will forever hang over it. See 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For example, in
Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas avoided using Lochner as precedent by grounding the
privacy right in various provisions of the Bill of Rights rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. See
381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965). Next, though invasions of privacy trigger heightened constitutional
scrutiny, in recent Court decisions state interests have frequently limited or outweighed privacy
interests and justified their invasion. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973); see also Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1992); Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739-40
(1997). In addition, despite the equation of privacy rights with personal autonomy, as with the
common law or privacy, a number of the justices view privacy as a set of discreet rights. At this
time the band of constitutionally-protected privacy rights remains narrow. For example, in his
concurring opinion in Casey, Justice Blackmun observed that Chief Justice Rehnquist views privacy
as a "laundry list," rather than "a principled account" of rights "grounded on a more general right of
privacy." 505 U.S. at 940. Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist has articulated a historical test for
determining what privacy rights are protected by the Constitution. One justification that Rehnquist
proffered for his historical test is a preference for controversial questions of individual and
community interests to be resolved by legislatures, not by the federal judiciary. See Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 740. The latter preference is widely-shared by Rehnquist's judicial colleagues. See, e.g., id.
at 736-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 769-71 (Souter, J., concurring) (characterizing the
historical test as a static approach to defining privacy rights that does not account for recent changes
in popular values and practices) The Court has not shown any predisposition to join Justice Souter
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significance is that violations of federal constitutional rights require
establishing state action. Based upon its state action requirement, to
employ the terminology of European legal scholars, American federal
constitutional privacy law only addresses vertical intrusions upon
privacy interests, by institutions or persons closely associated with
government. It does not address horizontal intrusions upon them by socalled private actors at all. In spite of some stiff criticisms that the state
action requirement has received from scholars, it remains vital. Indeed,
in recent federal constitutional law jurisprudence, the trend is for courts
to apply it with increasing rigor.83
Of great importance, and in contrast to the common law of privacy,
the development of constitutional privacy law during the twentieth
century by the United States Supreme Court has focused almost
exclusively upon decisional privacy, 84 and within that framework,
almost exclusively upon choice of sexual practices.8 5 In 1977, in Whalen
v. Roe, 86 the Supreme Court did flirt with recognizing a constitutional
right of information privacy. The state of New York had established a
computer file of the names and addresses of all citizens who used certain
drugs pursuant a doctor's prescription. In a classic example of viewing
privacy interests as individual, and of lesser value than social interests,
the Court, in a unanimous opinion, affirmed the state's power to
establish this information base. But the Court did accord some
constitutional basis to two individual interests. This included the
"individual interest in avoiding disclosures of personal matters," and

in adopting the more flexible approach to defining the scope of due process claims delineated by the
second Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman. See 367 U.S. 497, 540-41 (1961).
83. See Kevin Cole, Federal and State "'State Action ": The UndercriticalEmbrace of a
HypercriticizedDoctrine,24 GA. L. REv. 327 (1990).
84. The modem law is a departure from its origins, which also focused upon informational
privacy. Louis Brandeis again was the central figure in the birth of the constitutional strand of
American privacy law. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Brandeis dissented based on the view that a wiretap violated the Fourth Amendment's
limitations upon searches and seizures, which he connected to a privacy concept. See id. at 479.
85. Three cases decided between 1965 and 1973 established this focus. In Griswold,381 U.S.
at 497-98, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of a variety of
mechanisms to prevent conception. Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,the Court struck down
a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to individuals. See 405 U.S. 438, 45455 (1972). Though the exact scope of this decision remains disputed, and Justice Brennan's opinion
was careful to ground the decision upon a rational scrutiny of equal protection, it did extend
Griswold's holding beyond the domicile and married couples. Within a year, in its landmark
decision in Roe, the Court recognized a privacy right that conferred upon women a right to decide
whether or not to have an abortion during the first two trimesters of pregnancy. See Roe, 410 U.S. at
153-54.
86. 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).
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"the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions., 87 Because these are important interests, this language seemed
promising. The Whalen Court did not, however, connect these interests
with a privacy right, but instead founded their constitutional basis in the
Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent that the Court did conceive of
these interests in terms of privacy, it did so from the perspective of
decisional, not informational, privacy. It is not surprising, then, that
Whalen has not been the basis for developing any generalized
constitutional concept of information privacy.88
Unlike the federal constitution, some state constitutions have
explicit provisions endowing citizens with privacy rights. Some courts
have interpreted their state constitutions clearly to protect the
individual's privacy interest over personal medical information. 89 But
there remain a number of important limitations upon attempts to protect
personal control of genetic information under state constitutions. One is
that state constitutional rights are subordinate to federal statutory and
constitutional law, and "operate only interstitially." The expanded
privacy rights under a state's constitution cannot either conflict with
federal statutory constitutional rights or diminish a right exercised by
another party, like government or an employer. 90 Substantively, state
constitutional protections of privacy interests also suffer from major
limitations. One, similar to federal law, is that state constitutional
protection of health information seems to continue to focus only upon
disclosures of this information, not its collection. 9' Further, although
state constitutional law is mixed on this point, the clear trend since at
least the late 1980s is to require state action for privacy claims based

87. Id. at 599.
88. Nor do Hill or Norman-Bloodsaw provide a basis for such a generalized privacy right. See
supra note 57 and accompanying text. An excellent analysis of the Whalen opinion is found in Paul
Schwartz, The Computer in German and American ConstitutionalLaw: Towards an American Right

ofInformationalSelf-Determination,37 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 679-86 (1989).
89. See, e.g., King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 494 (Ga. 2000) (concerning hospital testing and
disclosure of plaintiff's blood alcohol level, not her genetic information). Id. The court
characterized King's privacy right as having "its foundation in the instincts of nature." The court
added that the "right of privacy guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution is far more extensive than
that protected by the Constitution of the United States." Id.
90. John Devlin, Constructing an Alternative to "State Action" as a Limit on State
ConstitutionalRights Guarantees:A Survey, Critique and Proposal,21 RUTGERS L.J. 819, 826-27

(1990).
91. This point is best demonstrated by a privacy claim under the Alaska Constitution by a
legal user of marijuana. The Alaska court dismissed the claim since the state government was
merely collecting information about marijuana use, not disseminating it. See Rollins v. Ulmer, 15
P.3d 749 (Alaska 2001).
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upon state constitutions. 92 Though not all the cases apply the state action
requirement with equal rigor, the trend again is to follow federal
constitutional jurisprudence and adopt a rigorous approach to what
constitutes state action.93
Despite the jagged character of the protection of personal control of
health information in American law, in its common law, statutory, and
constitutional forms, cumulatively this law is consistent, affording only
limited and sectoral protection for personal and genetic information.
This reflects a preference for public health interests and market
efficiency over personal control of health information. This
configuration of law, though not all of it has this intent, supports the
impulse of contemporary American law to treat genetic information as a
commodity. This view of personal genetic information reflects powerful
ideological currents in contemporary America.
B. An Enlightenment-BasedLegal Ideology
The limited and sectoral protection that American law provides for
personal health information is based upon a number of ideological
premises rooted in the Enlightenment. It was a broad and diverse
movement, with more moderate and radical phases.94 Premises from
both moderate and more radical Enlightenment thought have influenced
the legal ideology of American health information law. Sometimes ideas
drawn from these two phases of the Enlightenment do not fit nicely
together. For example, classical liberalism, a product of the moderate
Enlightenment, asserts that the free market acts benevolently in creating
wealth. Accordingly, if government, for the most part, would just keep
out of the way, the public interest would naturally be advanced by the
92. In a case that has attained some renown, the California Supreme Court interpreted Article
1, § I of the state's constitution not to require state action for a violation of a privacy right. In that
case, the court upheld a damage judgment against the doctor, insurance company, and lawyer who
disseminated the fact that the plaintiff had AIDS, a fact he disclosed to protect a nurse drawing his
blood for a workers' compensation claim. See Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991). But this decision is decidedly an exception in contemporary American constitutional
jurisprudence, even in the states.
93. See Devlin, supra note 90, at 859; see also JENNIFER FRIESEN, I STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES (3d ed. 2000); ROBERT F.
WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 247-84 (3d ed. 1999); Cole,

supra note 83.
One modest exception to the trend to require state action with increasing rigor is the
California Supreme Court's finding of state action in Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 595 P.2d 592 (1979). But that case was decided in 1979. Further, it is more plausible to find
state action when dealing with a telephone company than for most American companies.
94. See TAYLOR, supra note II and accompanying text.
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sum of thousands of private interests. 9 In contrast, the utilitarianism of
the radical Enlightenment called for law, sometimes comprehensive
schemes of law, that would create the public interest by subverting
private interests to the greatest good for the greatest number. But both
phases of the Enlightenment shared a number of the premises, and when
they are conjoined with a focus upon market efficiency, their differences
narrow. This section will briefly explore, and suggest problems with, the
Enlightenment-based premises and methodologies that shape the
American law of personal genetic information privacy.
1. Three Premises
i.

The Importance of Market Efficiency

This foundational premise is rarely analyzed in literature in relation
to personal information privacy. This is sometimes because, like all
bedrock premises, it is assumed. In addition, when lawmakers started to
intrude upon personal health information, they did so to further public
health interests. It is only recently that furthering public health interests
has been linked in some lawmaking and legal scholarship with market
efficiency.
Numerous areas of contemporary American law have been
influenced by the impulse for economic efficiency. The development of
American antitrust law during the past quarter of a century provides an
excellent example of its growing influence in shaping American
lawmaking. 96 Presumably, lawmakers view maximizing economic
efficiency as the most direct way to increase overall wealth, which they
link to raising the quality of human life. The modem economists share
this goal of increasing overall wealth with classical economists.
The impulse for economic efficiency, with the goal of increasing
wealth and therefore the quality of human life, is also the foundational
premise that justifies treating genetic information as a commodity. This

95. The foundational exposition of this position was contributed by Adam Smith. See
generally AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin

Cannan ed., 1937) [hereinafter THE WEALTH OF NATIONS].
96. Prior to the 1980s, judges applied a Populist interpretation to antitrust law. The Populist
view emphasized a highly competitive market of smaller enterprises. Since 1980, however, the
Chicago school interpretation of antitrust law has become ascendant. In contrast to the Populist
approach, the Chicago school above all favors economic efficiency. The goal of the Chicago school
is to maximize economic wealth even if this reduces economic opportunities for newcomers. See,
e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretationof Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1987).
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is because it is believed that the maximum availability of information
fosters market efficiency.
ii.

The Availability of Information Fosters Market
Efficiency

A fundamental article of faith animating contemporary American
lawmaking that facilitates the uses and disseminations of personal
genetic information, sometimes covertly, is that the availability of as
much information as is possible maximizes market efficiency. The
leading modem advocate of this view, as applied to personal
information, is Judge Richard Posner. Posner asserts that for the market
to operate efficiently, it must have ready access to all possibly relevant
information. For example, the more information available to employers
when they make decisions about whom to hire and fire, and to insurers
when they decide whom to accept or reject as clients, the more
efficiently will they make these decisions.9 7
This position is ultimately traceable to the rational instrumentalism
of the radical Enlightenment. It "conflates information with knowledge
of (or truth about) reality., 98 There are, however, a number of problems
with this position. First, human knowledge is based not only upon
information, but also upon technique, that is, the cognitive tools
employed to process information. In contemporary American society
"the prevailing technique is rationalizing" the information.99 Though
extolling the power of reason has a long and distinguished lineage in
Western civilization, at least as far back as Plato, there have also been
thinkers and movements that emphasize the importance of human
emotions, and subjective human motivations, as a basis of human
knowledge and experience. 1°°

97. Judge Posner proposed a two-prong test for the privacy of personal information, including
genetic information: (1)whether it is the "byproduct of socially productive activity"; and (2)
whether non-consensual disclosures would impair incentives to engage in such activity. Richard A.
Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393, 403-04 (1978). By these tests, Judge Posner
concluded that personal information should generally not be legally protected. See id.; George J.
Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUDIES 623 (1980)
(taking the same approach as Posner).
98. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1405 (2000).
99. Id. at 1405.
100. Two groups that readily come to mind who value emotions as a critical part of human
experience and knowledge are religious evangelicals, who have dotted the landscape of Christianity
since apostolic times (and have strong roots in the Gospel of John), and the Romantic movement of
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in both Western Europe and America.
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In addition, a conflation of information and reality relies both upon
the objectivity of reality, and the accuracy of human senses to perceive
this objective reality. Instead, a number of factors shape how one
perceives and understands information. They include a person's
background of education and experience, including shared cultural
perceptions; the process by which a person obtains knowledge; and how
a person uses it. There are a number of interesting examples that
graphically illustrate how these and other factors shape human
processing of information. A most interesting contemporary example is
how differently allergists and clinical ecologists evaluate and treat a
similar group of symptoms presented by their patients.10 1 A more
relevant contemporary example is provided by data processors. First,
their pre-existing biases and conceptualizations of reality help to shape
what information they wish to collect and how they gather it. Further,
their access to vast amounts of personal information endows data
processors with enormous power in two senses. One, of course, is that
they obtain power vis-d-vis the persons whose personal information they
control. They also can use this information to construct reality. 10 2 Similar
points can be made concerning biomedical researchers. For example, it
is in their interest, even if honestly and unconsciously, to reconstruct the
so-called reality of medical science in ways that increase their
companies' profits.

101. The common set of symptoms include red and watering eyes, congestion, nausea,
headaches, etc. Allergists view these symptoms as evidence of the body's immune system reacting
to such things as pollen and dust mites. Clinical ecologists view these symptioms as signs of
environmental harms from pollution, food additives, chemicals, and other features of the modem
environment, upon the human body. Some psychologists view people who have such symptoms and
seek treatment from clinical ecologists as neurotic. See NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CLAUDIA S.
MILLER, CHEMICAL EXPOSURES: Low LEVELS AND HIGH STAKES (1991).

102. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of PersonalHealth Care Information,
76 TEX. L. REV. 1,25, 36 (1997). Colin Bennett adds:
[T]he ability to assemble information selectively, or to correlate existing information,
can be functionally equivalent to the ability to create new information. This capacity,
obviously facilitated by information technology, enables agencies to identify, target, and
perhaps manipulate a certain segment of the population that has common background
characteristics.
COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE

AND THE UNITED STATES 19 (1992). Cohen concludes: "If data reveals truth, it is possible to attain
omniscience. If data constructs truth, it is possible to attain power." Cohen, supra note 98, at 1408.
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Personal Information Privacy is an Individual Value that
Harms Market Efficiency

If it were true that the more information available to the market, the
more efficiently it operates, then it is easy to see why persons like Judge
Posner view personal information privacy as a solely private value,
harmful to the public interest in the efficient operation of the market.
Unlike classical liberals who picture people wishing to be left alone,
Posner believes that they wish to manipulate the world by selective
disclosures of personal information. The desire of individuals to
manipulate personal information and to create the most favorable
impressions of themselves in their communities, is deceptive and
positively harmful to the market, and therefore to society. 10 3 This
viewpoint, of course, ignores possibly legitimate reasons why people
might wish to have control over their genetic information. These might
include the history of stigmatization of persons and groups; the
vulnerability of persons who live in modem societies, as decribed in Part
IV of this Article, or the desire to profit from voluntary disclosures of
their genetic information.
The cumulative effect of these three premises-the importance of
market efficiency, that the more information that is available the more
efficiently the market operates, and that personal information privacy is
an individual value harmful to the operation of the market-creates for
lawmakers a virtually irresistible impulse to view personal genetic
information as a commodity to be used for society's higher interests.
They implement this view by a utilitarian calculus that shapes modem
genetic information lawmaking.
2. The Utilitarianism Calculus Applied to Genetic Information
It is left to the utilitarian calculus to implement the three premises
just discussed and feed the impulse to commodify personal genetic
information. As noted in Part I.A, it seeks the maximum public utility.
Utilitarian lawmaking therefore aggregates human pleasures and pains to
attain the greatest good for the greatest number. Although this all seems
quite straight-forward, nevertheless the utilitarian calculus can prove to
be highly unreliable. For utilitarian analysis to reach quantifiable
conclusions, every relevant preference must be translated into a single

103. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, 2, 19, 20-22 (1978); see also Richard
A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1979); Posner, The Right of
Privacy,supra note 97, at 403-04.
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metric. 10 4 Since reducing human preferences to a single metric can be
quite difficult, utilitarian analysis can lead lawmakers in surprisingly
different directions.10 5 For example, it has been used not only to justify
of personal health information, but also non-disclosures of
disclosures
1°
it.i.106

The unreliability of the utilitarian calculus can violate the rule of
law that Europeans insist is foundational to a democratic society. Other
basic characteristics of the calculus can also lead to lawmaking that
undermines genuine democracy. To begin, the utilitarian calculus
abstracts human beings and their preferences and treats them as means,
not ends. At its end point, in the utilitarian calculus the individual ceases
to be a specific subject of moral concern. 10 7 This in turn facilitates
lawmaking that is coercive and paternalistic. Several centuries ago the
German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, who remains one of the most
important critics of utilitarianism in the history of Western civilization,
stressed that even if the desire for happiness among humans is universal,
happiness is a subjective and contingent value.' 0 8 By sacrificing

104.

See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 125-30

(2000).
105. In its process of defining and balancing values and disvalues, utilitarianism "does not
specify an external or objective basis for determining the good." In a diverse and disorderly world,
its valuation process is bound to be artificial and to yield diverse results. BEAUCHAMP & WALTERS,
supra note 12, at 17; see also MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 10 (1996). Professor
Singer observed that it is exceedingly difficult to rationalize and compare costs and benefits within a
single metric, and that there are many sources of indeterminancy in utilitarian measures that mask
unarticulated value choices. See SINGER, supra note 104. An early critic of utilitarianism was the
eighteenth century theologian Jonathan Edwards. He observed that utilitarian analysis "is without
beginning, and hangs on nothing." THE WORKS OF JONATHAN EDWARDS 123 (Edward Hickman ed.
1995).
• 106. This is demonstrated by the dissent in Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d
334, 355 (Cal. 1976) (Clark, J., dissenting). The essence of Judge Clark's view that Dr. Moore had
no duty to disclose the threat that his patient had made to the victim was that without an assurance
of confidentiality, those needing therapy would be deterred from seeking it, and that the therapy that
patients received would be less effective. Clark concluded: "Overwhelming policy considerations
weigh against imposing a duty on psychotherapists to warn a potential victim against harm. While
offering virtually no benefit to society, such a duty will ... increase violence." Id. at 358.
107. See generally UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra note 30. In another context Selya
Benhabib criticized the abstraction of persons, stating: "If all that belongs to (people) as embodied,
affective, suffering creatures, their memory and history, their ties and relationships to others, are to
be subsumed under the phenomenal realm, then what we are left with is an empty mask that is
everyone and no one." Selya Benhabib, The Generalized and Concrete Other, in FEMINISM AS
CRITIQUE 77, 89 (Selya Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell eds., 1988).
108. Kant wrote:
Men have different views on the empirical end of happiness and what it consists of, so
that ... their will cannot be brought under any common principle nor thus under any
external law harmonizing with the freedom of everyone.
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subjective personal interests and individual preferences to a
conceptualized public good, Kant concluded that utilitarian analysis
leads easily to coercive lawmaking. The same result occurs because
utilitarians aggregate human pains and pleasures. The contemporary
Kantian, John Rawls, observed that since utilitarianism justifies that "the
greatest gains of some should.. .compensate for the lesser losses of
others... the violation of the liberty of the few... [for] the greater good
shared by the many," it can even justify human slavery. 10 9 Historically,
this result has always been justified by the assertion that even citizens
who are denied free choice over matters deeply personal to them benefit
because the state embodies a higher consciousness of self. This view
justifies a form of paternalistic lawmaking that fuses the interests of
lawmakers with those of regulated citizens, coercively imposing a
rationalized order upon diverse human preferences, and thereefore upon
basic human liberty. "10
American law during the early twentieth century, when eugenic
thought was in vogue, provides a tragic example of how utilitarianism
can lead to coercive and paternal lawmaking with a vengeance. Starting
in 1912 a number of American state legislatures began to adopt statutes
permitting the sterilization of persons determined to be mentally
defective. The goal of these statutes was to elevate the human race by
purging it of defective genes."' The influence of eugenics seeped down
into popular culture, even impacting county fairs of that era. 1 2 In what
probably was a contrived case intended to test the constitutionality of
Virginia's statute authorizing the sterilization of the mentally defective,
the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell1 3 upheld the constitutionality of this,
and similar, state statutes. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Oliver

IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (L.W. Beck trans., 1959).

Some modem variants of utilitarian analysis try to take into account individual preferences.
109. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 22-23 (1999). Utilitarianism does not concern itself
with the distribution of pain and pleasure throughout society, only with the net maximization of the
balance of the two. See id. at 23.
110. See ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969); C.B. Macpherson, Berlin's
Division of Liberty, in C.B. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAY IN RETRIEVAL (1973).

The impetus of utilitarian lawmaking to lead to the imposition of a rationalized order, of course,
allows it to converge nicely with the radical Enlgihtenment's rationalized approach of human
knowledge. See discussion infra Part lI.B. I .ii.
11l.

See PAUL, supra note 5.

112. At such fairs, particularly healthy people and animals, received recognition (providing a
basis for E.B. White's classic, CHARLOTTE'S WEB (1952)). It may also have provided another basis
for the massive regime of segregation, based on the Jim Crow laws of that era, though I have never
seen any documentation of that connection.
113. 274U.S. 200(1927).
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Wendell Holmes, asserted that the community's higher interest in public
health justified the forced sterilization of a young woman, Carrie Buck,
who purportedly was mentally deficient. In a nightmarish paragraph
Holmes reasoned:
the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It
would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the
strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such
by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes ....
Three generations of imbeciles are enough.
Carrie Buck was the shorn lamb. Not only does Buck v. Bell violate
the solicitude of all of the major Western religions for the dispossessed,
disabled, and powerless, 1 5 it also illustrates how utilitarianism can
violate the most fundamental principle of democracy- the dignity of the
individual. The second formulation of famous categorical imperative of
114. Id.at207.
115. See Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations,No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (1985). Lombardo describes in detail the sad story of Carrie Buck and her forced
sterilization. She was very poor; devoutly religious; perhaps not mentally retarded; and her child,
who was clearly not retarded, may have been the result of Carrie being raped. See id.
All of the major Western religions condemn harsh treatment of the weak, dispossessed, and
disabled. The condemnations by Judaism and Christianity are closely linked. For example, in
establishing the Jubilee Year, Mosaic law placed an obligation upon everyone to care for any
"brother" who may "be waxen poor." Leviticus 25:39 (King James). The prophet Isaiah foresaw that
the principles of the Jubilee would be important in the future messianic age. One indication of this is
that good news would be brought to the afflicted. Isaiah 61:1-2 (King James). The prophet Micah
described that in "the last days," the Lord would gather in Zion the lame, outcasts, and afflicted as a
remnant, to walk in the ways of the Lord and live forever in peace. Micah 4:1 (King James).
Jesus adopted the Jubilee as a foundation of His ministry. When He returned from the
temptation in the desert, Jesus announced His ministry by quoting from Isaiah: 61:1-2, though
altering some of its language:
The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to
the poor; he hath sent me to heal the brokenhearted, to preach deliverance to the
captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised, to
preach the acceptable year of the Lord.
Luke 4:18-19 (King James) (emphasis added).
The QUR'AN, the scripture for Islam, has numerous passages warning against "devouring"
the poor, and a number of forms of domination or exploitation of the weak and dispossessed. For
example, it warns that those who devour the property of orphans will "soon endure a blazing
flame." 4:29-30. Muhammad also championed the cause of slaves and of exploited women. See
FRANK VOGEL & SAMUEL HAYES Ii, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK, AND RETURN
73-74, 78,84 (1998).
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Immanuel Kant eloquently states this bedrock principle of genuine
democracy. Since humankind is a kingdom of ends, Kant asserted that
no one should, "be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the
perish, human life
purpose of another.. . For if justice and righteousness
' 16
would no longer have any value in this world."
When utilitarianism emerged during the late seventeenth century in
western thought it may have represented a well-intentioned response to
the disintegrative effects of the process of modernization upon human
communities, and the specter of an emerging and potentially deeply
disruptive individualism that had emerged in Western culture a
generation earlier. Unfortunately, rather than repair the damage done to
both citizens and their communities by modernization, utilitarianism
exaggerates it. As described in Part IV.A of this Article, the process of
modernization isolated and weakened persons by rendering the bonds of
traditional communities. The paternalistic, coercive, and unreliable
utilitarian calculus further undermines human independence and dignity,
and thereby subverts the renewal of genuinely democratic communities.
3. American Privacy Law's Concept of Human Liberty and
Social Vision
To the extent that America's health information privacy law
protects citizens' control of their personal information, it embodies a
concept of human liberty that has been called negative liberty." 7 Under
this view people are free when they have ample space to think and act as
they choose the American concept of negative liberty has its roots in
English Enlightenment of the seventeenth-century, and specifically the
writings of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Hobbes well-described this
concept of liberty when he wrote: "Liberty, or Freedome, signifieth
(properly) the absence of Opposition; by Opposition, I mean external
,118 Based upon this view of human liberty,
Impediments of motion.
an important function of modern American law, and especially its
constitutional law, is to act as a shield, assuring individuals space to
think and act as they choose, free from the intrusive acts of oppressive
116. KANT, supra note 108. Article I of the Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine,
published by the Council of Europe in 1997, adopted the categorical imperative as the basis of its
definition of human dignity. 12 EUBOIS J. OF ASIAN AND INT'L BIOETHICS 90, 91 (2002).

117. The classic article that distinguishes positive and negative liberty is Isaiah Berlin, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in BERLIN, supra note 110, at 119-31 (first delivered as a lecture at Oxford
University on October 31, 1958).
118. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 261 (Penguin English Library ed., 1968). John Locke,
whose works were published a generation after than Hobbes' Leviathan, also was influential in the
formation of the concept of negative liberty in modem Western culture.
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government and majoritarian sentiment. Otherwise, government is to
keep largely out of the affairs of its citizens (a view consistent with the
classical economics described in Part II.B. 1)." 9
The privacy concept itself, as commonly understood in American
jurisprudence, represents this concept of human liberty. 120 Incidentally,
so does the state action limitation in American constitutional law
jurisprudence that can limit constitutional review of intrusions upon
privacy interests.1 21 The concept of negative liberty is in turn linked to a
vision of a deeply libertarian society. In its most extreme version,
negative liberty leads to Hobbes' possessive individualism. This is a
vision of separated and selfish individuals seeking their own ends in a
competitive and atomized society (that even in the seventeenth century
was becoming increasingly entrepreneurial). 122 But John Stuart Mill,
whose famous essay, On Liberty, reflected influences of the Romantic
Movement, presented a more uplifting vision of human creativity
spawned by negative liberty. 123 More recently, Justice O'Connor
articulated a contemporary version of the vision of creative human
119. Professor W. Cole Durham describes the privatized model of American constitutional
jurisprudence, which he views as highly influenced by Lockean thought. GeneralAssessment of the
Basic Law-An American View, 14 Nomos (19) 37, 46-47. In this jurisprudence, the private sector is
Expanding governmental regulation contracts individual liberty, and
the domain of freedom. See id.
so limited government is the goal. See id.
The American approach is graphically illustrated by a case in which a policeman came to
the scene of an accident with an overturned car that caught fire. He directed traffic, but failed to
discover that there were people in the car, who burned to death. When their estates sued the
municipality, the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Posner, rendered a judgment for
the defendant. Posner based his decision upon a strictly negative view of American constitutional
rights. See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 CHI. U. L. REV. 864
(1986).
120. This point is made well by a list of interests covered by the privacy concept in David
Flaherty's selective study of Western privacy laws. See DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING
PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE,
CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 8 (1989). These interests include: individual autonomy; being

left alone; a private life; limiting accessibility; minimizing intrusions; confidentiality; enjoying
solitude and intimacy, anonymity, and reserve; and enjoying secrecy. See id.The one element of
privacy that Flaherty lists that comes closest to exceeding the negative liberty concept is the power,
which he casts as a right "to control information about oneself." Id.
121. Professors Robert J. Glennon, Jr., and John E. Nowak argued that what courts do under
the state action rubric is to weigh whether the alleged violation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights
is sufficiently damaging to outweigh the liberty interest of the defendant. See Robert J. Glennon Jr.
and John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action"
Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221,226-27; see also Devlin, supra note 90; Cole, supra, note 83.
122.

C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO

LOCKE 3 (1962) [hereinafter POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM].
123. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 249-361
(Max Lerner, ed., 1961); see also Charles Taylor, Wat's Wrong with Negative Liberty, in THE IDEA
OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ISAIAH BERLIN 175-76 (Alan Ryan ed., 1979).
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development nurtured by the free space of negative liberty. In Planned
Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey she wrote:
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of
24
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.1
Justice O'Connor's vision of the creative human personality is
much more appealing than was Hobbes' of selfish individualism.
Nevertheless, her vision is still one of dispersed individuals who live in
an atomized society (albeit a gentler one than that of Hobbes'
imagination). This same separation of the individual from the social
whole is distilled in the central metaphor for the American law of
privacy rights, the "zone of privacy," as well as in the "right to be let
alone" articulated by Charles Warren and Louis Brandeis in their
landmark article on privacy law.12 5 These metaphors graphically depict
legal boundaries drawn around citizens, separating them26 from
communities, rendering them isolated and devoid of civic virtue. 1
The concept of negative liberty, and its related vision of human
existence, is a relative newcomer in Western thought.' 27 Instead, for
millennia Western thinkers, both secular and religious, and from many
nations, have conceived of human beings flourishing within
communities. 12 However important community has been to human
flourishing throughout Western history, in Part IV.A this Article will
insist that it is even more so in a world in which people have been
separated from most personalized human bonds by the process of
modernization. Jennifer Nedelsky rightly concluded that the new
"language of [American constitutional]
law" that lawmakers should
29
relationships.
highlight
must
adopt
124. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
125. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 195; see also Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries,
and the Bounded Self 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162, 169 (1990) [hereinafter Bounded Sel]; Jennifer
Nedelsky, Re-conceiving Rights as Relationship, I R. CONST. STUD. 1 (1993).
126. The feminist Robin West complained that the right of privacy is devoid of all civic virtue,
demanding "nothing of the citizen beyond self-regarding behavior." Robin West, Taking Freedom
Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 69, 71-72 (1990).
127.

See MACPHERSON, POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM, supranote 122.

128. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, supra note 117; Taylor, supra note 123.
One example that graphically makes this point is found early in the Bible. When God
relegated Cain to wander about the earth, Cain protested: "My punishment is too great to bear."
Genesis 4:13 (King James). Eventually Cain would settle in the land of Nod, east of Eden, establish
a city and have a family. See id.
129. Nedelsky, Bounded Self supra note 125, at 162-63. An emerging view among feminist
thinkers is that the real value of the communitarian critique of rights is not to destroy rights
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A start in this direction is provided by the very different approach
of the law of the EU to the control and uses of personal genetic
information. It suggests a different social vision from that which
underlies American law.
III.

EUROPEAN UNION LAW: A HUMAN RIGHT IN PERSONAL GENETIC
INFORMATION

From the inception of the European Community in the 1950s its
lawmakers evinced concern for human rights, including a right of
citizens in their personal information. There are a number of sources for
the concern of European lawmakers for human rights. They begin with
the awful experience of World War II, justified by eugenic science. The
domestic laws of a number of European nations after World War II,
notably Germany and Italy, gave special attention to human rights.' 30 So
did post-war international law, two documents being of particular
significance: They are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948; and the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, ratified by a number of European nations in 1950. Another
important source of human rights in the EU was the development of the
concept of citizenship, most notably in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.131
The development of contemporary EU law protecting personal
information began in the 1970s, reflecting concern in Europe for
personal privacy spawned by the birth of computer technology. The
body of law that developed in member states over the next quarter of a
century in turn provided background for the articulation of a
comprehensive law of personal information privacy by the EU in
1995.132

ideology, but to re-conceive of rights as "one way of regulating and constraining our behavior
toward one another in a desirable manner." Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism,
14 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 308 (1985).
130. German lawyers insisted that the emphasis of their domestic law upon human rights as a
condition for Germany joining the European Community. BVerfG, 2 BvL 1/97 (Jun. 7, 2000).
131. For the development of human rights law in Europe, see CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EUROPEAN UNION LAW (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002). In Nold v. Commission, Case
473 ECR 491 (1974), the court stated that in protecting human rights it "is bound to draw
inspiration from constitutional traditions common to Member States," and that "international
treaties," can supply guidance which should be followed within the framework of community law.
132. An excellent overview of the phases of development of EU privacy law is provided by
Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Generational Development of Data Protection in Europe, in
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 219-28 (Philip Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds.,
1997).
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Significant in the earliest development of the emphasis of EU law
to protect citizens' control over their personal information was Article
12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United
Nations in 1948. It states:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home, or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the33right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks. 1
The language of Article 12 directly influenced what became the
foundation of the modem European law of information privacy. This is
Article 8 of the Convention of Human Rights, which provides in
subsection one that, "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence."' 134 Subsection two
required that those who would intrude upon this right act "in accordance
' 35
with the law ... [that] ... is necessary in a democratic society."'
Reflecting the World War II experience of state-based eugenics,
however, Article 8 addressed only intrusions upon personal privacy by
governmental officials and bodies (the vertical effect). Violations of
human rights are ultimately enforced by the European Court of Human
Rights. 136 Since 1950, the Court has greatly expanded the scope of
Article 8 by interpreting its specific language according to what the
Court perceives as its underlying rationales.
The development of the information privacy laws of the European
states has been described well elsewhere. 137 Some of the earlier state law
would anticipate important features of later EU data protection law. The
laws of Germany and France are of particular interest in this regard,
since these two countries heavily influenced the shaping of the Data
Protection Directive. 138
133. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at art. 12, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
134. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, availableat http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/
Treaties/Html/005.htm.
135. Id. at art. 8(2).
136. Cases alleging violations of human rights can be filed in the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights, by states either as plaintiffs or defendants, or by any state that
signed the Convention in 1950. Individuals cannot file claims.
137. See FLAHERTY, supra note 120; JAMES MICHAEL, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (1994); SPIROS SIMITIS, DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
THE QUEST FOR COMMON RULES (1994).

138. See Paul M. Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 295, 324-33 (1995) [hereinafter Privacy in Health Care Reform]. The focus upon facets of
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There are a number of themes of the law in these two countries that
would help to shape later EU data protection law. One of these was to
treat personal information as a human right. A foundation of German
constitutional law since the end of World War II, for example, is respect
for human dignity, 139 and based upon it recognition of "the right to free
development of his personality."'140 From these principles of Germany's
Basic Law its Constitutional Court has developed a constitutional right
that applies to all personal information, including genetic information. 14 1
Various German statutes afford particularly strong protection for
personal control over personal health information,
and cumulatively they
42
treat health information as "sensitive" data.'
The laws of both countries recognize a human right in personal
information as essential to human liberty. For example, Article 1 of the
1978 French law that is a foundation of its law concerning personal
information states that "information shall be at the service of every
citizen... It shall infringe neither human identity, nor the rights of man,

French and German law does not at all suggest that these facets of their laws are necessarily unique.
For example, the constitutions of Greece, Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal all broadly protect
personal privacy. See Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the
Protectionof PersonalData,80 IOWA L. REv. 445,450,455-56,462. (1995). Not only does German
law consider health information to be sensitive, so do French, Belgian, Spanish and Portuguese
laws. See id. at 450. French law is far from unique in establishing an independent commission to
oversee who controls the uses of personal information. German law establishes both a federal Data
Protection Commissioner, and also counterparts of this position in all of the German states. See id.
139. Kurt Sontheimer, Principles of Human Dignity in the FederalRepublic, in GERMANY AND
ITS BASIC LAW 213, 216 (Paul Kirchof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
140. Grundgesetz ir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, GG, Basic Law for the Federal
Republic of Germany, May 23, 1949, Federal Law Gazette, art. 2, subd. 1 (emphasis added). The
Basic Law recognizes that "human dignity shall be inviolable." Id. at art. 1, subd. 1. It also
recognizes, "inalienable human rights as the basis of every community." Id. at art. 1, subd. 2. Article
2 of the German Basic Law, entitled "Personal Freedom" states:
(1) Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he
does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the
moral law.
(2) Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the person
shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only on a law.
Id.
141. 65 BverfGE 1, 44 (1983), reprinted in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 332-36 (1989).

142. For example, the Federal Data Protection Law prohibits the transfer of health information
for direct marketing; the Code of Social Law permits the collection of health information for social
welfare programs only when a specific legal provision provides for this, and it forbids the transfer of
health information to clearinghouses. See Privacy in Health Care Reform, supra note 138, at 32526. German law, however, views all sensitive data contextually.
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nor private life, nor individual or public liberties. 14 3 44
The German
Constitutional Court also explicitly makes this connection.
Another important characteristic of the laws of these two countries
is a broad protection of personal information, related to a wider concept
of human liberty than the negative liberty characteristic of American
law. French lawmakers, for example, coined a new word, l'informatique,
to indicate that its law would protect a broadly defined sphere of
personal information. The Tricot Report, the basis for the 1978 French
law, elaborates upon the broad scope of what it conceives to be personal
information. 145 French law also established the important principle that
"no judicial decision ...[and] ...[n]o governmental or private decision
involving an appraisal of human conduct may be based solely on any
automatic processing of data which describes the profile or personality
of the person concerned.' ' 146 German law associates the law's wide
protection of personal information with a concept of liberty
that provides
147
personality.
human
the
of
development
the
for
a basis
Finally, although they are not unique among European countries in
this respect, France and Germany established officials or institutionsx to
oversee the administration of personal information law. For example, an
important feature of the 1978 French Law was to establish an
independent governmental body, the Nationale d'Informatique et des
Libertis (National Commission on Informatics and Liberties, or
"CNIL") to oversee all aspects of the administration of laws concerning
personal information privacy, including transfers of personal information
outside of France. The care that the CNIL exercises in protecting the
143. See Act 78-17, Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties, Jan. 6, 1978, § 2,
translated in DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS (Spiros

Simitis et al.eds., 1994) [hereinafter Act 78-17 on Data Processing]. This idea is embodied in the
French title of the law, "Commission nationalede l"informatiqueet des libert~s." See also Rapport
de laCommission Informatique et Libertrs (1975).
144. Volkszahlungsurteil 65 BverfGE 43 (1983).
145. The Tricot Report discusses how the protection of private life with respect to the
collection, processing, and harmful dissemination of certain information has been one of our
dominant preoccupations. However, just what the term private life means has not been defined. The
Report goes on to note that lawmakers should exercise their powers to protect all liberties, and not
only those associated with private life. See La Rapport Tricot (Aug. 26, 1975) (on file with author).
146. See Act 78-17 on Data Processing, supra note 143. French law also regulates automated
processing of most personal data by a system of licensing, but later EU law has not adopted this
approach. See id. at § 16.
147. The leading German authority on European data protection law, Spiros Simitis affirmed
that the goal of the Federal Data Protection Law was, "to protect the personal interests of the
individual affected by the storage and retrieval of their data, and thus to ensure the free development
of their personality." Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 707, 730, n.99 (1987).
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anonymity of genetic information is illustrated by an arresting episode
from France during the 1980s. 148 Andre Chaventr6, director of the
Department of Anthropological and Genetic Demography of the Institut
Nationale d'Etudes Demographique ("INED"), accidentally discovered
a high incidence of juvenile, or open-angle, glaucoma in a region of
northern France near the English Channel. Eventaully a team of
demographers were able to trace the origin of this disease to a single
couple who lived in the small village of Wierre-Effroy during the late
fifteenth century, (not coincidental since the village had a cistern filled
with water believed to cure blindness). Since this form of glaucoma is
insidious, but also treatable if detected early, Chaventr6 wanted to
disclose the names of the young people who carried the open-angle
glaucoma genetic defect to French ophthalmologists. But the CNIL
asserted that such disclosures would violate the French Information
Privacy Law of 1978.141 What the CNIL did allow was for INED to alert
doctors about the existence of this genetic defect, and urge them to look
for it in their teenage patients.
By the mid 1970s lawmakers began to explore the idea of
establishing a privacy law for the EU itself. 50 On October 24, 1995 the
European Council published the Data Protection Directive ("DPD"), the
centerpiece of the privacy law of the EU.151 The term data protection in
Europe is similar to what American lawmakers refer to as information
privacy, although, as in French and German law, defined more
broadly. 5 2 This is the most important single document in the entire
constellation of European information privacy law.
The foundational theme of the DPD is that it confers a human right
upon citizens in their personal information. It links this right to the
existence of human liberty and genuine democracy. Article 1(1), states
that, "Member States shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms
of natural persons, and in particular their right of privacy with respect to
148. The following information was reported in Alexander Dobozynski, Privacy Rules
Blindside French Glaucoma Effort, 252 SCI. 369 (1991).
149. This law provided that persons about whom information is collected must know how the
information is to be used. The law includes information derived from medical research because its
dissemination can, "cause prejudice to a patient because it informs him he is affected by a severe
disease." Id. at 370.
150. The impulse to develop a European law of privacy goes back at least to 1976, when the

Committee of Ministers instructed the Committee of Experts on Data Processing, under the aegis of
the European Committee for Legal Co-operation, to prepare a treaty for the protection of
information privacy in light of new technology of data collection. See A.C.M. NUGTER,
TRANSBORDER FLOW OF PERSONAL DATA WITHIN THE EC 25 (1990).

151. See Council Directive 95/46, Oct. 24, 1995, (EC) [hereinafter DPD].
152.

See DANIEL SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 688 (2003).
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the processing of personal data.' 53 The DPD's Preamble elaborates
upon the linkage of this human right to human liberty and democracy.
Section 1 makes the important assertion that the DPD seeks to promote
"democracy on the basis of ... fundamental rights."' 154 Section 2 asserts
that since "data-processing systems are designed to serve man," they
must be used in ways that respect "fundamental rights and freedoms,
notably the right of privacy."' 155 Section 10, by citing Article 8 of the
Convention of Human Rights as precedent, explicitly places the DPD
within the framework of human rights law that had been developing in
Europe since the end of World War II.
Consistent with the view that citizens have a human right in their
personal information, the DPD broadly protects personal control of data,
including genetic information. Section 10 of the Preamble states that
because personal privacy is a human right, EU law must "seek to ensure
a high level of protection" of data privacy. 56 Consistent with this
commitment, in a number of important ways the DPD provides
comprehensive legal protection for personal information. To begin, the
definition of personal data in Section 2 is broad, and it clearly covers all
sorts of personal health information, including genetic information. 57 Of
great significance for the protection of personal health information,
including genetic information, is that Article 8 of the DPD includes it
among the "special categories" of sensitive data.
The DPD's scope of coverage of how data is obtained is also very
broad. Resisting efforts by Britain to exempt manually-recorded data,
the DPD brooks no distinction in how personal data is obtained and
stored.' 58 Also, the DPD transcends the focus of post-World War II law
upon governmental intrusions into personal privacy. Instead it makes no
distinction between them (the vertical effect), and intrusions by any
private person or organization (the horizontal effect). 59 By refusing to
153. DPD, supranote 151, at art. 1, § 1.
154. Id. at pmbl. § 1.
155. Id. at pmbl. § 2.
156. Id.atpmbl. § 10.
157. See id. Article 2(a) defines "personal data" to include "any information relating to
an.. identifiable natural person," and concerning his or her "physical, physiological, mental,
economic, cultural, or social identity." Id. at art. 2(a). The Preamble to Article 29 makes clear,
however, that the DPD does not cover anonymous clumps of personal data that cannot be traced to a
specific person. See id. at art. 29.
158. See id. at art. 3, § I ("This Directive shall apply to the processing of personal data wholly
or partly by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic means.").
159. Spiros Simitis, who has been a leading figure in the development of EU privacy law,
expressed the European viewpoint relative to who controls health information in the following
passage:
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recognize this distinction, the DPD departs from the state action
requirement of American law.
In this respect the DPD is consistent with the wide protection that
general European law affords personal information. A striking example
is provided by the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in
Niemietz v. Germany.'60 It held that Article 8 of the Human Rights
Convention encompassed the state's seizure of documents in a lawyer's
office related to a criminal proceeding. In doing so the Court rejected
any clear line between private and public spheres of life in the protection
of citizens' control of162their information.' 61 In other cases the Court has
made a similar point.

The DPD was the product of intense lobbying efforts. Sprinkled
throughout it are provisions that recognize limited exceptions to personal
information privacy. Even in Article 8, there are some important
limitations placed upon data privacy. Of particular significance for
genetic information is Paragraph 3, which allows for a number of uses of
sensitive data for health-related purposes, when these uses are subject to
member state law regulations of their secrecy, or to persons with "an
equivalent obligation of secrecy."' 163 In general, the limitations that the
DPD recognizes upon personal control of information, including genetic
information, can be classified under three general headings. One is to
accommodate important concerns of member states, like national
security, defense, public security, and economic and financial
concerns. 164 Second, the DPD recognizes the importance of the flow of

Patients in a private clinic are, as far as the use of their data is concerned, in the same
situation as those treated in a hospital belonging to the state. Employees are confronted
by the same problems with respect to their data whether they are employed by a
computer firm or by a tax authority. The implications of processing for customers do not
change because a bank is... owned by the state.
Simitis, supranote 138, at 452.
160. 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1993).
161. See id. In this case, the court rejected the argument of Germany that Article 8 had drawn a
clear line between private and public activities, observing that "[v]irtually all professional and
at 28,
business activities may involve, to a greater or lesser degree, matters that are confidential," id.
and that "[i]t is not always possible to distinguish clearly which of an individual's activities form
part of his professional or business life and which do not." Id. at 29. It also added that in Germany
the word "home" has come to include "business premises." Id.at 30.
162. In Rotaru v. Romania, 191 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000). The Court held that the records of a
person's political activities and possible criminal acts fall within the protection of Article 8.
163. The Directive also delegates to member states to decide to what extent sensitive
information can be used on a personal identifying card or system.
164. These concerns are listed in Article 13 of the DPD. See supra note 151. Public security
includes criminal investigations, though, Neimetz demonstrates that there are limits upon how much
government officials can intrude upon personal privacy even for this purpose.
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information to the smooth operation of the market and for scientific
endeavors. 165 Third, the DPD, and European privacy law generally, will
limit a citizen's control of personal information when this significantly
diminishes a right of another person. 166 This last category of exceptions
to citizens' control over their personal information is related to another
important characteristic of European data protection law. That is, it
conceives of persons living within communities, and therefore their
rights are also defined67within the framework of the rights of others
within the community.1

Nevertheless, the exceptions themselves are hedged in three
important ways. First, the structure of Article 5 of the DPD suggests a
strong presumption for the privacy of personal information. 6 1 Second,
the DPD requires that "data which are capable.., of infringing on
fundamental freedoms or privacy should not be processed unless the data
subject gives his explicit consent .... ,,'69 Third, as in French law, the
DPD mandates that "[m]ember States shall grant the right to every
person not to be subject to a decision which produces legal
effects.., which is based solely on automated processing of [personal]
data . .

,,170

165. The early sections of the DPD's Preamble demonstrate this concern. For example, they
express the desire to contribute to "economic and social progress, trade expansion, and the wellbeing of individuals." DPD, supra note 151, at pmbl. § 2. This includes "the functioning of an
internal market, in which, in accordance with Article 7a of the Treaty, the free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital is ensured." Id. at pmbl. § 3. They envision that the DPD will
contribute to "a substantial increase in cross-border flow of personal data." Id. at § 5; see also DPD
art. 26, § 1, (limiting Article 25's prohibition of the trans-European flow of personal information to
countries whose laws do not afford adequate protection for personal information privacy). Sections
29 and 34 of the Preamble state that processing of personal data for "scientific purposes" is not
incompatible with the DPD. Id. at pmbl. §§ 29, 34.
166. See section 2 of the Preamble, which allows for the processing of personal information
when this contributes to "the well-being of individuals." Id. at pmbl. § 2.
167. In the often-cited Census Case of Germany, the court stated: "The individual does not
possess any absolute, unlimited mastery over 'his' data; rather he is a personality ... developing
within the social community." 65 BverfGE 1, (1983), reprintedin KOMMERS, supra note 141 at 322.
A very important case in modem German jurisprudence illustrating the application of this
view is the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court finding a statute liberalizing abortion rights
to violate the Basic Law. The Court limited the mother's right of human personality because of
recognition of the dignity of all human life, even ofa pre-birth infant. Abortion Case, 39 BverfGE 1,
(1975), reprintedin KOMMERS, supra note 141, at 348-62.
168. Article 5 states that all "personal data" is protected except when its use is legally
authorized elsewhere in the Directive. DPD, supra note 151, at art. 5.
169. Id. atpmbl. § 33.
170. Id at art. 15(1) (defining personal data as data "intended to evaluate certain personal
aspects relating to him, such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct,
etc."). An Explanatory Memorandum of the EU's "European Agency for Safety and Health at
Work" suggests a strict interpretation of this Article. See Agency's Rules on Freedom of Information
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The general approach of how the DPD protects personal
information is typical of European human rights law. That is, it endows
citizens with a broadly-conceived human right. But, it carefully views
the exercise of human rights by the impact they have upon the rights of
their communities and other citizens living within them. If on balance
the impact of the exercise of a human right is considered 7to be too
harmful within the community framework, courts will limit it.' '
In contrast to American law, the DPD establishes a cradle-to-grave
scheme of regulation of how personal data is collected, controlled,
processed, and transferred while in the hands of outside parties. In sharp
contrast to American law, the regulation of personal data under the DPD
begins with its collection. This includes the requirement that the user
prove a legitimate purpose for seeking the data.172 Pursuant to Article 5,
the user can seek only as much data as is absolutely necessary for the
user's legitimate purpose. When the collected and processed data is
identifiable to a specific person it can be kept only as long as is
necessary for the user's purpose.173 When a person's data is collected
and processed, that person must be notified and given a considerable
amount of information about the collection process. 74 The user of the
data must obtain an affirmative, unambiguous consent of the person
whose data is at issue before it can be processed. 75 Users must also act

and
Protection
of
Privacy
and
Personal
Data,
available
at
http://agency.osha.eu.int/publications/other/19960916/en/index l.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2005).
For it to apply, the processing must be based on "variables which determine a standard profile." The
decision must also be adverse to the person. Finally, it suggests a strict application of the word
"solely." Id. For example, if an employer includes factors about a person in addition to personal
information data in making an employment decision, then presumably the employer has not violated
the Article.
171. See, e.g., Connolly v. Comm'n, Case C-274/99P 2001 ECR 1-1611. In this case, the Court
upheld a limitation upon the plaintiff's right of freedom of expression. It justified this decision "by
the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others. The rights at issue here are those of the
institutions that are charged with the responsibility of carrying out tasks in the public interest.
Citizens must be able to rely upon their doing so effectively." Id. at 46. This approach,
incidentally, should allay the fears of American lawmakers and companies, that EU data protection
law will greatly interfere with the operation of a global information market.
172. Article 13 lists some of these purposes, including: national security; defense; public
security; in connection with criminal investigations or proceedings, or for breaches of professional
ethics; for an important economic interest of the European Union or a member state; and as is
necessary to protect the rights of others. See DPD, supra note 151, at art. 13.
173. See id. at art. 6.
174. See id. at art. 10. It requires, for example, that the citizen whose personal data is collected
be informed of who is overseeing the process, the purpose of the collection of the data, who will
receive the data, and the individual's right of access to the data. See id
175. See id. at art. 7. But there are some loopholes in this protection. First it is unclear whether
the requirement of unambiguous consent applies to all data covered under the DPD. See Shaffer,
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"fairly and lawfully" in processing the collected data, 7 6 suggesting that
they must act not only according to the provisions of the DPD and
relevant domestic law, but ethically, in using another citizen's data.
Article 12 assures that citizens whose personal data is collected can have
access to the data, and make corrections to it. Article 14 confers upon a
person the power to "object at any time on compelling legitimate
grounds relating to his particular situation," regarding uses of personal
data.177 A user of personal data cannot transfer it to a third party without
disclosing the identity of the third party, and without the clear consent of
the citizen whose personal data is being transferred. 178 Individuals have a
right, without cost, to object to transfers of their data. 179 Of great
significance, Article 25 of the DPD also restricts the transfer of personal
an
data outside of the EU unless the recipient country provides
"adequate level of protection" of personal information privacy.' 80
Again in contrast to American law, especially HIPPA, the DPD
confers upon persons whose data is under scrutiny significant
enforcement rights. First, to assure enforcement of the Directive, Article
28 mandates that member states designate an independent public
authority responsible for monitoring the application of the entire data use
system. Article 28 also delineates the minimum supervisory authority
that these supervisors must possess. In general, they must be able to
investigate data processing, and to block uses of personal data that they
believe to violate the DPD or that state's laws. 181 Further, it confers a
number of rights upon individuals whose data is being used, and also
consumer advocacy groups, concerning the entire process of collection
and use of the data. This includes the right of individuals to challenge
the data's accuracy, and to block further processing of it or its
dissemination. 182 Individuals and consumer groups can lodge complaints
83
that require public supervisors to investigate the use of their data.
Court review of this process must be made available to all aggrieved
supra note 13 at 14. Second, Article 7 provides for five categories of explicit exceptions to the
requirement of consent. See DPD, supra note 151, at art. 7.
176. See DPD, supra note 151, at art. 6.
177. Id. at art. 14(a).
178. See id. at arts. 10, 11.
179. See id at art. 14(b).
180. This language suggests assessing of each country's information privacy laws case by case,
taking into consideration all aspects of the law. Id. at art. 25. It also provides a number of exceptions
to this requirement, including when the data subject consents to the transfer, are necessary for the
performance of certain contracts, and is necessary to serve an important public interest.
181. Supervisors must also make regular reports on their work. See id. at art. 28.
182. See id. at art. 12.
183. See id. at art. 28(4).
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damages, as
citizens. Remedies for breaches of the DPD include civil
84
well as civil and criminal fines and even imprisonment.'
The DPD is a carefully crafted and detailed legal document.
Nevertheless, its general themes are quite clear. They begin with
endowing citizens with a human right in their personal information. The
purpose of this right is to provide citizens with sufficient control over
their personal information so that they can realistically and effectively
exercise informational self-determination. 185 The document recognizes
that the empowerment conferred upon citizens by a human right of
information privacy is essential to the development of genuine
democracy within the EU. More so than American law, the DPD
conceives of personal privacy issues and democratic values from a
community perspective.
Since the adoption of the DPD a decade ago, the European law of
data protection has continued to develop, including the protection of
personal genetic information. The DPD creates a floor of protection that
the laws of all member states must at least meet, but which they can also
exceed. Further, under European law, a directive requires lawmaking by
member states to implement it.186 Of great significance is that directives
have only a vertical effect, regulating intrusions upon personal privacy
by governments, and not a horizontal effect. Therefore, to limit
intrusions upon personal privacy by private groups and institutions
would require domestic lawmaking.' 87 Once member states have adopted
laws in response to the mandate of a directive, the directive actually
becomes part of the nation's law. Judges must integrate the two bodies
of law in individual cases. Further, courts of member states can, in

184. See id. at arts. 22-24.
185. Mayer-Sch6nberger, supra note 132, at 232-35.
186. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) art. 189.
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome] (defining the foundational source of law for the EU, states that
directives are one form of European community law). They are binding only as the result to be
achieved, and leave to national law the implementation of the mandates of directives. National
courts must interpret their domestic laws in ways to achieve the objectives of directives. See Case
152/84, Marshall v. Southhampton & Sw. Hampshire Area Health Auth., I C.M.L.R. 688, 712
(1984); Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kaman v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2 C.M.L.R. 430 (1986)
(affirming the holding of the Court). Article 24 of the DPD delegates to member states a large
measure of authority to establish sanctions for breaches of the Directive. See DPD, supra note 151,
at art. 24.
187. This description of the effect of directives is generally accurate. Neverthelss, in certain
cases directives can have some horizontal effect. One of these is for triangular relations. Further,
states are supposed to interptret their domestic laws consistentaly with relevant directives, giving
directives what is sometimes called an "indirect", and sometimes horizontal, effect.
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particular cases, act as preliminary institutions in the resolution of cases
before they go to the European Commission.
Since the publication of the DPD a decade ago, EU lawmakers have
continued to address various aspects of information privacy, especially
the privacy of personal genetic information. Notable documents include
the Council of Europe's Convention on Human Rights and BioMedicine, adopted in 1997; twenty-five recommendations published by
the European Commission in 2004 concerning the ethical, legal, and
social implications of genetic testing; and also the EU's Charter of
Fundamental Human Rights, published on December 2, 2000.
We can expect more lawmaking to be forthcoming from the EU in
the near future concerning the legal protection afforded to citizens to
control their genetic information. 188 For example, an interesting concept
that is presently floating within the circles of informed thought about
genetics, in both Europe and America, is to view persons tied by blood,
akin to the older extended family, as a new biological unit in legal
thought. Presumably, the adoption of this view would permit the free
flow of genetic information within this unit. Further, it would conceive
of claims for the privacy of genetic information not from the viewpoint
of a particular individual, but from the viewpoint of blood lines. 8 9

188. One example is the Working Document in the Application of Genetics for Health
Purposes, CBD1/1NF (2003), available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legalaffairs/Legalcowhich
operation/Bioethics/Activities/Humangenetics/INF(2003)3egenetics workingdoc.asp,
presently is in consultation and embodies principles akin to those in the 1997 Convention. See also
NAT'L BIOETHics ADVISORY COMM'N, 1996-1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1998) (suggesting additional
proposals for the use of the European Parliament).
189. The Council of Europe defines genetic data as data relating to "the hereditary
characteristics of an individual or concerning the pattern of inheritance of such characteristics
within a related group of individuals." Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, The Protection
of Medical Data, REC(97) 5, Feb. 13, 1997. President Clinton's Executive Order of February 8,
2000 defines protected genetic information to include information "about the occurrence of a
disease, or medical condition or disorder in family members of an individual." Exec. Order No.
13145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000), available at http://www.genome.gove/l0002084.
This view would seem to comport with the EU's view that human beings flourish within the
bonds of human associations. On the other hand, the free flow of genetic information within blood
lines allows the possibility of placing eugenic pressures upon women and couples in making
reproductive decisions, and altogether too many possibilities for cases of human domination. See
discussion infra. Further, it is difficult to maintain anonymity of genetic data when it is distributed
among members of a blood line. All of these possibilities contradict the spirit of the EU's data
protection laws, and suggest that any move in this direction by EU lawmakers will be cautious and
measured.
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As with its inception, the EU law of privacy continues to have a
symbiotic relationship with international law.1 90 This was illustrated by
the adoption in 1980 of the Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development ("OECD").191 Some of the foundational
principles of the guidelines were later incorporated in the DPD. 192 More
recently, UNESCO published the Universal Declaration on the Human
Genome and Human Rights. 193 One reason that the Declaration is
important is that it recognizes the importance of limiting horizontal 1as
94
well as vertical intrusions upon the privacy of genetic information.
Another is its comprehensiveness, both in drawing from many fields,
including science, law, and ethics; and in addressing a wide array of
issues related to the uses of genetic information. The Declaration rejects
a mechanistic view of human beings based upon their genetic
materials.1 95 Though the Declaration is concerned with protecting human
rights related to all forms of control and uses of genetic data (which it
recognizes as particularly sensitive) 196 it also embodies an optimistic
vision of human progress.1 97

190. See David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection. An
InternationalSurvey of Privacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments, 18 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 1 (1999).
191. The OECD can be found at http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en 2649 201185_
1815186 1_1_1_1,00.html. It is a group of major industrial countries from around the world,
including the United States. See id.
192. For example, a basic principle of this document is limitations upon the collection of
personal data. See supra notes 165-81 and accompanying text. The data must be obtained in
accordance with law, and with the consent of the person whose data is being collected. See supra
note 166 and accompanying text. Personal data can only be collected for a specific purpose, and can
only be used for that purpose. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. The document also
assures persons access to their personal data, including the right to correct inaccurate data. See
supranote 174 and accompanying text.
193. Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, available at
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php=
URLID 13177&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201 .html [hereinafter Universal
Declaration].For the limitations of this document see H.D.C. Roscam Abbing, Introduction,
UNESCO'S InternationalDeclaration of Human Rights, II EUR. J. OF HEALTH LAW 93 (2004).
194. See Nodlle Lenoir, The Human Genome: From UNESCO to the UN, in SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNOLOGICAL: DEVELOPMENTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 171, 171-77 (Linos-Alexander Sicilianos &
Maria Gavouneli eds., 2001). The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948
had focused upon governmental violations of human rights.
195. Article 3 states, "The human genome, which by its nature evolves, is subject to mutations.
It contains potentialities that are expressed differently according to each individual's natural and
social environment, including the individual's state of health, living conditions, nutrition and
education." See UniversalDeclaration,supranote 193, at art. 3.
196. Article 1 of the Declaration states "[t]he human genome underlies the fundamental unity
of all members of the human family, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and
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AMERICAN LAWMAKERS SHOULD ALSO ENDOW CITIZENS WITH A
HUMAN RIGHT IN THEIR GENETIC INFORMATION

This Article concludes by providing a policy basis for American
lawmakers to endow citizens with a human right in their genetic
information. It begins by reviewing how the historical process of
modernization has rendered those who live in contemporary societies
weak and vulnerable to harms from outside sources. It then notes
evidence of the rising power of private eugenics in contemporary
America. It concludes by reviewing American sources supporting the
empowerment of persons so that they can regain the independence
necessary to be citizens of genuinely democratic communities.
A.

The Process of Modernization andHuman Vulnerability

The material framework for considering contemporary genetic
information privacy law has been shaped by a cataclysmic process of
modernization that began to affect Western civilization as early as the
twelfth century. 198 It has already transformed Western culture, and is
now having a similar impact upon the cultures of many Non-Western
countries across the globe. Both secular and religious literature exist that
describes the process of modernization well.1 99 The sources of
modernization include fundamental socio-economic, demographic, and
cultural changes. They have transformed not only social institutions and
practices, but even the way people think, as well as the most mundane
aspects of daily popular culture.
The process of modernization has had both creative and positive
and destructive and negative impacts upon human life. Technological
advances and new economies associated with modernization have
diversity. In a symbolic sense, it is the heritage of humanity." Id. at pmbl. "The aims of the
Declaration are to ensure the respect of human dignity and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the collection, processing, use and storage of human genetic data." Id.
197. See generally Lenoir, supra note 191.
198. See generally Brian TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES IN NATURAL
RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW, AND CHURCH LAW 1150-1625 (1997); Caroline Walker Bynum, Did the

Twelfth Century Discover the Individual?, 31 J. ECCLESIASTICAL HIST. 1 (1980); Colin Morris,
Individualism in Twelfth-Century Religion: Some Further Reflections, 31 J. ECCLESIASTICAL HIST.
195 (1980).
199.

C. E. BLACK, THE DYNAMICS OF MODERNIZATION: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE HISTORY

26-34 (1966). A year before the publication of Black's study the Second Vatican Council, in the
"Introduction" to Gaudium et Spes, outlined in similar terms the sweeping and disruptive effects of
modernization. See Gaudium et Spes, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II (Walter M. Abbott ed.,
1966), availableat http://www.cori.ie/justice/cath soc thought/PapalEncyclicals/ppaulVI!
Gaudium etspes.pdf.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss4/8

48

Cole: Authentic Democracy: Endowing Citizens with a Human Right in Thei
20051

A HUMAN RIGHT IN GENETICINFORMATION

expanded human choice and enhanced human lifestyles in
unprecedented and desirable ways. 200 But modernization has also
engendered many dislocations, including massive geographical, as well
as social and economic, mobility that undermined traditional
communities. Older hierarchies and personal bonds dissolved, and
persons living in modernized societies became rootless and
disempowered. Modernization also increased the power of outside forces
that can intrude upon persons and their communities. In early modern
Europe powerful monarchs began to emerge who reduced or eliminated
the power of local aristocrats and consolidated power into new nationstates. They established governmental bureaucracies that were small, but
still acted with unprecedented efficiency. 20' Later, the industrial
revolution spawned large enterprises, organized as corporations, that
operated with unprecedented power and efficiency. Meanwhile, in
modern industrial nations, governmental bureaucracies grew much
larger, more efficient, and powerful.20 2
Leading nineteenth century thinkers insightfully described how
modernization destroyed traditional communities and isolated people.
One of these thinkers was Alexis de Tocqueville, the acute French
observer of antebellum America. America's democracy had engendered
a new man, the individual, separated from all human bonds, vertical and
horizontal. 20 3 According to the German thinker, Max Weber, the primary
human relationships of the new man were forged through contracts, "the
most impersonalized relationships of practical life into which humans

200. For example, it has expanded the range of affordable goods available to most people;
facilitated expanded educational and travel opportunities; and in manifold ways elevated the
lifestyle of those who live in modernized societies. Smith's THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note
95, foresaw many of these changes.
201. See THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE (Charles Tully ed.,
1975).
202. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 (1992);
see also LEWIS L. GOULD, REFORM AND REGULATION: AMERICAN POLITICS, 1900-1916 (1978);
REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1982).

203. de Tocqueville wrote:
As social conditions become more equal, the number of persons increases
who.., have... retained sufficient education and fortune to satisfy their own wants.
They owe nothing to any man, they expect nothing from any man; they acquire the habit
of always considering themselves as standing alone, and they are apt to imagine their
whole destiny is in their own hands.
Thus, not only does democracy make every man forget his ancestors, but it hides his
descendants, and separates his contemporaries, from him ....
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 120 (Henry Reeve trans., 1961).
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can enter into with one another., 20 4 The end result of this process,
according to Karl Marx, was human alienation. Human beings became
abstracted from all social and historical contexts, and in the process had
become profane and viewed merely as means. 20 5 Even contemporary
conservative thinkers like Robert Nozick have also emphasized the
devastating impact of modernization upon human community, observing
of contemporary life is the "fact of our
that a defining characteristic
20 6
existences.
separate
The destructive effects of modernization upon human life constitute
what Charles Black called the "agony of modernization., 2 7 The process
of social disintegration that modernization entailed is represented by the
evolution of the word "individual" during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. The meaning of the word "individual" experienced a
metamorphosis, from being conceived of as something indivisible to its
modem meaning of the isolated, distinctive, and self-contained,
person. 2 0 8 Like Cain, after he killed Abel and was relegated to wandering
rootlessly about the earth, modem people live an isolated existence that
renders them disempowered and vulnerable to harms from a multitude of
powerful outside forces.20 9
The process of modernization also has made personal genetic
information easier to obtain and disseminate. Today, a person's genetic
code, as well as other health information, is easily obtainable: from
saliva, a single cell of a blood sample, or even from a lock of one's hair.
Modem science can also easily reproduce a person's genetic code.2 10
These advances in scientific knowledge, coupled with the recent trend to
customize health care, increase the possibilities for misuses of personal
health information. Customized health care requires the collection and
204. MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 192 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward
Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954). The end of these human relations became who could cheat
whom. See id.
205. Karl Marx, On The Jewish Question (1843), in THE MARX-ENGELS READER (Robert C.
Tucker ed., 1978).
206. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33 (1974).
207. BLACK, supra note 196. Among the disruptive effects of modernization listed in Gaudium
et Spes, supranote 196, at 2, 1 6, is the breakdown of "traditional local communities."
208. See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 13334 (1976). The etymological roots of the word "individual" are "in-not--dividere," (which means
divide). Id. Although the meaning of "individual" evolved over several centuries, its use by Adam
Smith in THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 95, published in 1776, was critical in its transition
to its modem meaning. See also MACPHERSON, supra note 122.
209. Genesis 4:12-14 (King James).

210.

With present technology scientists can make an infinite number of copies of DNA from a

single blood sample. See George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy: There Ought to be a Law, 4 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 9,10 (1999).
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storage of extensive medical information, including one's genetic code,
for each patient. Until recently patient medical information was recorded
on paper and stored in community-based health care offices or
institutions. In this setting the circulation of medical information was
limited. The rise of electronic information technology, coupled with new
integrated delivery systems of medical services, transformed the entire
system of storage and distribution of personal medical records. 1 Today
this system has become thoroughly nationalized. Further, mainframe
computers and the Internet facilitate the collection, analysis, storage, and
wide and rapid distribution of huge amounts of genetic information to
potentially unlimited numbers of users anywhere across the globe.2 12
The new technology is also creating a worldwide information
market. In it the control, uses, and flow of personal genetic information
are of particular importance.213 For example, those engaged in medical
research view the accessibility of personal genetic information as basic
to their efforts to improve human health. Corporations, which are
increasingly multi-national, desire genetic information in making all
sorts of decisions relative to the employability and insurability of
persons. All levels of governments in modernized countries seek
enormous amounts of information about persons, including genetic
211. According to the American Health Information Management Association, an average of
150 persons, including doctors, nurses, x-ray technicians, and billing clerks, have access to the
medical records of patients who are hospitalized. See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
STANDARDS FOR PRIVACY OF INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH INFORMATION (1998).

And this is just the beginning of who can gain access to personal health information once its
privacy is violated. See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., STANDARDS FOR PRIVACY OF
INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH INFORMATION, FINAL RULE (2001) [hereinafter STANDARDS

FOR PRIVACY (2001)], availableat http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/medrec/hipaa final rule.pdf.
212. Lawrence Gostin et al., Privacy and Security of Health Information in the Emerging
Health Care System, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 1 (1995); see also STANDARDS FOR PRIVACY (2001), supra
note 208.
Some recent lawmaking also recognizes the implications of the new technology for personal
control of genetic information. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-501; WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.02.005 (2005). The nexus of technological change and concern for health information privacy
is captured in a bill introduced into the 105th Congress by Representative McDermott of
Washington. See Medical Privacy in the Age of New Technologies Act of 1997, H.R. 1815, 105th
Cong. (1997). Its stated purpose was to "protect the privacy of health information in the age of
genetics." § 2(a)(6) asserts that "technologies that permit an individual's health information to be
computerized increase the possibility of unauthorized electronic access to the information." Id. at
§ 2(a)(6).
213. Most transactions will tend to be recorded; the records will tend to be kept longer;
information will tend to be given to more people; more data will tend to be transmitted over public
communication channels; fewer people will tend to know what is happening to the data; the data
will tend to be more easily accessible; and data can be manipulated, combined, correlated,
associated and analyzed to yield information which could not have been obtained without the use of
computers. See PAUL SIEGHART, PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS, 75-76 (1976).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

51

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1241

information, for a variety of purposes, especially for the prevention and
prosecution of crime and for making some decisions concerning
eligibility for state benefits. Now armed with computer technology, all
of the organizations, public and private, that have emerged since the
early modern period, exercise an exponentially increased capacity to
gather, use, and disseminate all manner of personal information,
including genetic information.
Within the material framework of the process and effects of
modernization briefly outlined in this section, American law is
inadequate in the protection that it affords to citizens from harms by
intrusions upon their genetic information. Concern about these intrusions
is heightened by the recent rise of private eugenics.
The Recent Rise of Private Eugenics
Since the conclusion of World War II, state-based eugenics has
fallen into disfavor in most countries of the world. However, with little
notice, during the past generation attempts to enhance or cleanse the
human gene pool have resurfaced. Egg and sperm banks provide an
example of efforts to enhance the gene pool. An example of the impulse
to cleanse the gene pool is efforts to encourage women and couples to
consider the genetic implications of having children. The Office of
Technology Assessment stated the implications of the HGP in the
following way:
Human mating that proceeds without the use of genetic data about the
risks of transmitting diseases will produce greater mortality and
medical costs than if carriers of potentially deleterious genes are
or to
alerted to their status and encouraged to mate with noncarriers
214
use artificial insemination or other reproductive strategies.
More coercive is a joint resolution adopted by the International
Huntington's Association and the World Federation of Neurology in
1990. It refused to test women for a genetic predisposition to
Huntington's Disease ("HD") unless they promised to terminate a
pregnancy when it was discovered the fetus had an increased risk of
2 15

HD.

214. Michelle R. King, Physician Duty to Warn a Patient's Offspring of Hereditary Genetic
Defects: Balancing the Patient's Right to Confidentiality Against the Family Member's Right to
Know-Can or Should Tarasoff Apply, 4 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1, 3 n.13 (2000); see also Diane
Paul, Is Genetics Disguised Eugenics?, in GENES AND HUMAN SELF-KNOWLEDGE: HISTORICAL
AND PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON MODERN GENETICS 74, 78-79 (Robert F. Weir et al. eds.,
1994) [hereinafter Paul, Is Genetics DisguisedEugenics?].

215. Paul, Is Genetics DisguisedEugenics? supra note 211, at 77-78.
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As we have seen, coercion deeply marred the first, state-based
eugenics movement and it is not entirely absent from recent practices of
private eugenics. Two practices that can place pressures upon women
and couples in making reproductive decisions are genetic counseling and
genetic screening. In response to the horror engendered by the eugenics
during the second quarter of the twentieth century, after World War II
genetic counseling in theory became non-directive, and thereby
supportive of genuine individual autonomy. There exists substantial
evidence, however, that even non-directive genetic counseling is not
neutral.21 6 Similarly, offering genetic screening can place subtle
pressures upon women thinking about procreation, and can also
stigmatize the dispossessed and powerless. 17
Although women and couples whose socio-economic status is low
are most vulnerable to practices that can influence reproductive
decisions, no one is immune from such pressures. 218 At the root of
attempts to influence women and couples in making reproductive
decisions is the persistence of the view, foundational to all stripes of
supporters of eugenics from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth
century, that decisions to have children are a matter of public concern.21 9
External pressures upon reproductive decisions will increase as new
genetic knowledge fuels the present hope for enhanced human health,
and the future vision of a superior human race. For example, a futuristic
book published by Professor Philip Kitcher suggests various
mechanisms, including the education of teenage students to encourage
216. Dorothy C. Wertz, Eugenics is Alive and Well: A Survey of Genetic ProfessionalsAround
the World, II SC. CONTEXT 493, 508 (1998); Diane Paul, Eugenic Anxieties, Social Relations, and
Political Choice, 59 SOC. RES. 663 (1992).
217. Professor Roscam Abbing observes that: "The mere offer of a screening programme puts
the individual under strain to know or not to know." H.D.C. Roscam Abbing, Some Legal Aspects of
Genetic Screening, 22 MED. LAW 201, 209 (2003). When "the screening test is offered for the
purpose of procreative choice (pre-natal or pre-conceptual), it can put the individual under
constraint of 'socially correct' decision-making. The increased possibilities of prenatal screening
may contribute to a climate in which acceptance of the handicapped will come under great
pressure." Id.
218. In third-world countries a lack of available services and economic constraints often exert
great pressure upon women and couples in their reproductive decisions. Even in America, in which
wealth is distributed primarily by market forces, such factors can have an impact. This depends
upon a number of variables, relating to the economic status of the woman and couple, as well as the
availability of services offered to them from municipal, county, state, and federal governments. See
ANDREWS, supra note 77 at 59.
219. Even John Stuart Mill, the most eloquent defender of individual autonomy in nineteenthcentury English culture, classified decisions to parent and have children "as one of the most
responsible actions in the range of human life," and as "matters of public interest" that government
could validly regulate. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in THE ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART
MILL 353-54 (1961).
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what he perceives to be responsible family reproductive decisions that
take account of genetic defects. 2 1 Recent laws that would place a legal
duty upon doctors to disclose genetic defects they discover in their
patients to family members or the even newer idea that it is the family
blood line that is the unit rather than the individual who controls genetic
information, also raise the possibility of creating eugenic pressures upon
persons to cleanse their gene pools.
Disclosures of genetic information among family members, though
seemingly quite private, can sometimes create the basis for human
domination. Martha Minow reminds us that "[i]n reality, the family is
not an entity, but a collection of individuals who have relationships with
one another.,22 1 John Hardwig warns of the real, and sometimes, deep
conflicts of interests, beliefs and values among family members. 2
Hardwig's warning of conflicts of interests and values among family
members is particularly relevant because involuntary disclosures of
genetic information confer power upon their recipients. There is a huge
difference between voluntary and involuntary disclosures of personal
information like one's genetic makeup. The latter renders one
constrained, coerced, or manipulated to act on behalf of another's
interests or aims. Such actions not only do not contribute to the person's
self-development, they are forms of domination. 223 In contrast,
empowered persons, endowed with control over their genetic
information, can freely choose to disclose personal genetic information,
basis for the deepest and most personalized of
providing an important
224
human relationships.

220. KITCHER, supra note 8. In 1910 Francis Galton, the founder of the science of eugenics,
delineated the characteristics of a utopia, called Kantsaywhere, in which people adhered to strict
laws regulating procreation. See Pierpoint, supra note 8. Kitcher's focus is upon family planning,
but one can without difficulty imagine the use of genetic information for greater intrusions upon
reproductive choice.
221. Martha Minow, Who's the Patient?, 53 MD. L REv. 1173, 1182 (1994). In the Bible the
deepest human bonds were shared by persons without blood ties, like Jonathan and David; or even
persons with different ethnic backgrounds, as were Ruth and Naomi. Conversely, the Bible is
replete with examples of family discords and betrayals, including of Abel by Cain, of Joseph by his
brothers, and of Esau by Rebekah and Jacob.
222. John Hardwig, What About the Family?, 20 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5 (1990).
223. CAROL C. GOULD, RETHINKING DEMOCRACY: FREEDOM AND SOCIAL COOPERATION IN
POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY 48-50 (1988). This domination can be manifested either by

reshaping relationships among family members and blood relatives, or by a recipient of such
information disclosing it outside the family circle. See id.
224. Relying heavily upon the philosophers Immanuel Kant and John Rawls, Professor Charles
Fried argued that the individual's control of personal information is the precondition for voluntarily
disclosures of information that are essential to forming relationships of love, friendship, and trust.
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A HUMAN RIGHT IN GENETIC 1NFORMA TION

An American Ideology of Empowerment Justifying a Human Right
in PersonalGenetic Information

There exist several contemporary factors that encourage American
lawmakers to seriously consider adopting the approach to information

privacy of EU law. One is international comity. 225 This is a consideration
that American to which lawmakers must begin to pay heed as a global
information market becomes a reality. 2 6 A second factor is American
public opinion. The recent wave of health privacy legislation during the
past decade in America is rooted in increasing popular support for such
law in America. This is demonstrated by a Harris survey finding that
eighty-five percent of patients surveyed asserted that the confidentiality
of the medical information they provided to doctors was very important
to them. 7 The recent wave of health information privacy legislation
reviewed in Part II.A.2 of this Article attests to the public support for the

view that genetic information privacy is an important matter.
This section, however, will elaborate an ideology that justifies
endowing citizens with a human right in their personal genetic
information, one that is rooted in American history. Basic democratic

values of respect for human dignity, of human liberation, and of the
empowerment of citizens have strong roots in American legal traditions.
This lawmaking tradition has had a number of manifestations, including
the empowerment of persons by endowing them with land, the right to
public education, and more recently, the expansion of public benefits.
The intended result of this lawmaking is liberated and independent
CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE 142

(1970); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
225. The root word comitas suggests the practice of courtesy or civility.
226. For examples of the numerous scholarly writings that have addressed this very issue, see
SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 152; Shaffer, supra note 13. So far, both American diplomacy
and companies have sought to facilitate the globalizing information market by trying to persuade the
EU to lower its information privacy standards. But as other scholars, notably Shaffer, have pointed
out, another way to harmonize the global information market is for American law to "ratchet up" its
standards. Shaffer, supra note 13, at 11.
227. Roger E. Harris, Note, The Need to Know Versus the Right to Know: Privacy of Patient
Medical Data in an Information-BasedSociety, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1183, 1186 (1997).

A survey of popular opinion conducted by the California Health Care Foundation in 1999
concluded that "public distrust of private and government health insurers to keep personal
information confidential is pervasive." Only one-third of the persons surveyed expressed trust in
private and governmental health plans to "maintain confidentiality all or most of the time." Onefifth of the respondents believed that their health care information had been disclosed
inappropriately. Mistrust of the uses of medical information provided to web sites to obtain medical
advice was even deeper, with almost ninety percent of the respondents asserting that this
information would be misused. ELIZABETH HADLEY, Preface, in THE STATE OF HEALTH CARE
PRIVACY: AN UNEVEN TERRAIN (1999).
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citizens who can flourish and provide the basis for authentic democratic
communities.
A wide distribution of landholding has deep roots in American
history, back to the early colonial period in New England. 22' But the
emergence of a democratic ideology justifying a wide popular
distribution of land to Americans occurred during the eighteenth century.
Celebration of agriculture and the agrarian lifestyle was in the air in the
eighteenth century, in both Europe and the American colonies. It had
multiple sources.22 9 American agrarianism was ultimately forged within
the particular context of the colonies' democratic revolution and the
abundance of land in the New World.230 In retrospect, historians have
called the ideology justifying the wide distribution of land the freehold
concept. It has a number of propositions, two that are of particular
importance for us. The first is that ownership of land, the means of
production in a pre-industrial society, provides a basis for human virtue,
dignity, and self-realization. The second, less recognized in literature, is
that though land ownership provides the basis for independence, citizens
are integral to, and provide the foundation for, virtuous democratic
231
communities.
A number of American colonial writers, notably Benjamin
Franklin, George Logan, and St. John de Creveccuer, contributed to the
development of the freehold concept. After America's successful
revolution from British colonial rule, the federal constitution for the new
228. Both law and practice of the early Puritan New England colonies provided for a much
wider distribution of land among settlers than existed in the England they had just left. This point is
clear from both the initial distributions of land that the colony and its towns made to settlers, and
from the law regulating the intestate inheritance of land. In contemporary England the principle of
primogeniture guided intestate succession of land, and so the eldest son inherited all of a family's
real property. In stark contrast, the law of intestate succession in the seventeenth-century New
England colonies was by partible inheritance. Pursuant to it, each child, male and female, received
an equal portion of the family's real estate, with the exception of the eldest son, who received a
double portion.
The seventeenth century English colonies in America were not democratic. Other factors,
including the need for labor; Puritan Biblicism, (the basis for the adoption of partible inheritance);
and the availability of land in the New World; influenced law and practice of land distribution in
these early colonies. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d

ed. 1985).
229. These included the ideologies of the Physiocrats, and later the Romantics, in Europe, as
well as a revival of interest in ancient classics. See Paul H. Johnstone, In Praise of Husbandry, 11
AGRIC. HIST. 80, 80-95 (1937); see also A. WHITNEY GRISWOLD, FARMING AND DEMOCRACY

(1948).
230. See Chester E. Eisinger, The Freehold Concept in Eighteenth-CenturyAmerican Letters, 4
WM. & MARY Q. 42,43 (1947).
231. GRISWOLD, supra note 229, at 43-47. For a classic exposition of the freehold concept, see
HENRY NASH SMITH, VIRGIN LAND: THE AMERICAN WEST AS SYMBOL AND MYTH 166-73 (1950).
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nation contained strong protections for property rights. One reason for
this was the influence of James Madison during the drafting of the
document.
But it was Thomas Jefferson who most fully developed the freehold
philosophy, and whose writings were most influential in shaping later
American culture's celebration of it. 232 By 1776, the young Jefferson had
already formulated his version of the freehold concept. In that year he
wrote the Declaration of Independence, which included the most famous
statement in all of American political literature, that all men have a
natural right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." In the same
year, in the legislature of his home colony Virginia, which was in the
process of becoming a state, Jefferson introduced three bills that tried to
implement the Declaration's philosophy by providing the material basis
for an independent yeomanry. These bills proposed the abolition of both
the common law of entails and primogeniture, and that every citizen be
endowed with fifty acres of land.2 33
Throughout his life Jefferson remained steadfast in his commitment
to create an empowered and independent yeomanry as a basis for a
virtuous democratic community. Unlike the aristocratic Physiocrats of
his era, who favored large landed estates, Jefferson, in both his writing
and lawmaking, sought a wide distribution of land. This is because he
believed that landowning, particularly as a basis for agriculture,
provided the basis of economic independence of citizens. What was of
greatest importance to Jefferson was that this economic independence
had salutary moral, political, and broadly cultural effects. He made this
point clearly in one of the most quoted passages in his Notes on the State
of Virginia (1785). In it Jefferson wrote that, "[t]hose who labor in the
earth are the chosen people of God... whose breasts He has made His
peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue., 2 34 In contrast to the
virtue of the independent yeoman, Jefferson continued, "Dependence
begets subservience and veniality, suffocates the germ of
virtue ...generally speaking, the proportion which the aggregate of the
other classes of citizens bears in any State to that of the husbandman, is
the proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts, and is a good enough
232. Jefferson's freehold philosophy was enormously influential in shaping nineteenth-century
American culture, and its premises remains important even today. See SMITH, supra note 231. See
also JOYCE APPLEBY, THOMAS JEFFERSON (2003).
233.

A. Whitney Griswold, The Agrarian Democracy of Thomas Jefferson, 40 AM. POL. SCI.

REv. 657, 660-61 (1946). As always with Jefferson, when he referred to everyone, he meant white
males, not women or African-Americans.
234.

THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 164-65 (William Reden ed.,

1955)
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barometer whereby to measure its degree of corruption. ' 2 35 Jefferson
was particularly worried about human dependence because he was aware
of the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution in England. He foresaw
that landless wage laborers in industrial factories would become
particularly dependent and vulnerable.
There are two related and very important premises that are implicit
in the views that Jefferson expressed in his Notes on Virginia. First, the
premise of Jefferson's view that widespread landowning could provide
the basis for a morally uplifted citizenry is that the human personality is
not static, but rather capable of attaining a higher self. Next, although
Jeffersonian valued and championed the concept of negative liberty
(exemplified, by his ardent support of freedom of religious conscience),
implicit in his association of landownership with human independence is
a concept of moderately positive liberty. That is, human liberty is
comprised not merely of free space for thought and action, but requires
conditions empowering persons to attain their higher selves.236
Four years after the publication of his Notes on Virginia Jefferson
again affirmed the importance of a wide distribution of unencumbered
land as critical to establishing empowered and independent citizens. In a
letter he wrote to James Madison on September 6, 1789, Jefferson
asserted that, "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living." 23 7 Like the
Declaration's "life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness," this assertion
seems to be pregnant with potential implications. In this context, what is
most significant about this letter is that Jefferson begins it by expressing
concern about law that allows debts of one generation to be passed onto
the next. To him, such law is contrary to "natural right," for it allows the
dead to burden the free use of the land by the living. 238 Jefferson's
advocacy for law that prohibited contracting debts that could be passed
on to later holders of land reinforced the empowerment theme in his
vision of a freehold republic, and was consistent with his earlier
legislation abolishing entails and primogeniture and endowing all white
males with fifty acres of land.
But without doubt the act that demonstrated Jefferson's unwavering
support for an empowered citizenry living in a empire of liberty with a
wide diffusion of land ownership was the Louisiana Purchase. The
Purchase encompassed almost 900,000 square miles of land-as large as
235. Id.
236. See Taylor, supra., note 123.

237. This letter can be found in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 292-97 (Julian P. Boyd
ed., 1958).
238. Id. at 293.
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the combined territory of Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, France, and
the United Kingdom-and its acquisition would almost double the size
of the United States at that time. In Jefferson's view it would provide the
basis for a freehold republic for generations to come. France, needing
money for the Napoleonic wars, wanted to consummate the deal quickly.
During the negotiations Jefferson drafted a constitutional amendment to
provide a legal basis of authority for the Purchase, but there was not time
to adopt it. So Jefferson departed from his usual strict construction of the
Constitution and made the deal. 239 It is commonly believed that limited
government was a core characteristic of Jeffersonianism. The Louisiana
Purchase, however, demonstrates that Jefferson's bedrock commitment
was to the liberation and empowerment of independent citizens. When
limited government did not serve this end, he was willing to depart from
it.240

The vision of a society of empowered, virtuous, and independent
citizens living in a democratic society remained vital in American legal
culture long after Jefferson's presidency. During the antebellum, or
Jacksonian, period of American history, there occurred a hydra-headed
movement calling for reforms, including legal reforms, of many aspects
of American society.24 1 Within this constellation of antebellum
reformism, of particular relevance here is the movement for universal
public education of children. In a letter written to John Tyler in 1812,
Jefferson had expressed support for the universal education of
citizens.242 By the antebellum era, a reform movement supporting it was
spearheaded by Horace Mann of Massachusetts. In his twelfth report on
education in 1846, Intellectual Education as a Means of Removing
Poverty, and Securing Abundance, Mann expressed concern about the
increasing disparity in the distribution of wealth during the antebellum
period, raising the possibility of class conflict and a new feudalism in
America. Mann's antidote to this dreaded specter was universal
education, transcending the lines of class, and providing each man "the

239.

APPLEBY, supranote 232, at 65.

240. Jeffersonian limited government was shaped not only by his support for civil liberties, but
also by his recognition that centuries of mercantilist regulations of human economy had been a
tremendous drag upon human creativity. See id. Jefferson's views of political economy were highly
influenced by Smith's THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 95.
241. John L. Thomas, Romantic Reform in America, 1815-1860, 17 AM. Q. 656 (1965). Popular
reform movements included intense missionary work, utopian communities, Sunday schools and
universal public education, proper diet, and a variety of legal reform movements. The list of these
movements is long, and includes antislavery, a women's movement, Sabbath-observance,
temperance, and institutional care for the deviant and dependent. Id.
242.

The letter is published at LIPSCOMB & BERGH, WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, 12: 93-94.
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independence and the means by which he can resist the selfishness of
other men" and attain his higher self.2 43 Mann envisioned that universal

education, stirring the infinite capabilities of each person, would lead to
a more perfect American democratic community.244
Reflecting both the influence of Romantic thought and evangelical
religion, Mann, in contrast to the utilitarianism that shapes contemporary
American law of genetic information privacy, viewed the human
personality not as static, but as a reservoir of potential, capable of
perfectability. 245 Mann affirmed that everyone, even the blind, the deaf
and dumb, and mentally disabled, had within them "the latent spark of
intelligence. 24 6 As had Jefferson, Mann believed that true human
liberation entailed empowering persons with the means to develop their
human potential. Like other reformers of that era, Mann also believed
that social progress was rooted not in institutional reforms, but in
citizens, through moral reform, realizing their higher selves.
The Civil War proved to be the death-knell of the antebellum
period's broad-based impulse for social reform. Nevertheless, the vision
of the freehold republic retained vitality. It undergirded the Homestead
legislation passed by Congress during that period.24 7 Even into the New
Deal era, when America for many reasons had moved far from the
reality of that vision, remnants of the freehold concept persisted.248

243. Horace Mann, Report No. 12 of the Massachusetts School Board (1848), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/6.htm. Mann wrote:
Under the Providence of God, our means of education are the grand machinery by which
the 'raw materials' of human nature can be worked up into inventers and discoverers,
into skilled artisans and scientific farmers., into scholars and jurists, into the founders of
benevolent institutions, and the great expounders of ethical and theological science.
Id.
244. Id.
245. Gordon Wood, EvangelicalAmerica and Early Mormonism, NEW YORK HISTORY, 359
(1980).
246. Mann, supra note 243, at 58. How different this is from the view of the disabled and
dispossessed that underlay the eugenics statutes of the early twentieth century, and the forced
sterilization of Carrie Buck in Buck v. Bell.
247. It allowed families who settled upon and farmed land to own up to three hundred and
sixty acres of land after five years. The legislation had a number of ideological justifications, but in
the West the critical one was the vision of the freehold republic. SMITH, supra note 231, at 170.
Homestead legislation culminated several generations of political activism attempting to
democratize the distribution of land in America. See generally PAUL GATES, THE FARMERS AGE:
AGRICULTURE, 1815-1860 (1960).

248. Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Secretary of Agriculture, Wickard wrote in 1944: "The U.S.
Department of Agriculture believes that the welfare of agriculture and of the nation will be
promoted by an agricultural land tenure pattern characterized by efficient family-size owneroperated farms." GRISWOLD, supra note 229, at 661. Several of the reasons why the vision had
become obsolete include an exponential rise of American population, making less land available for
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By the late nineteenth century forward-thinking Americans had to
come to grips with the end of the American frontier and the nation's now
full-blown industrial order. The Progressive ideology that came to
dominate American culture during much of the twentieth century would
depart sharply from the American tradition of local and limited
government. For example, Progressive thought was the seedbed for
249
paternalistic lawmaking, including public health utilitarianism.
Nevertheless, one of the central concerns of Progressives was how, in a
modernized world that seemed to dwarf the individual, to maintain the
Jeffersonian vision of independent citizens enjoying real liberty in
authentic democratic communities. For Progressives, in a modernized
world this would require affirmative lawmaking providing a basis for
human autonomy. As early as 1907, in his popular and influential book
The Promise of American Life, Herbert Croly asserted that in
contemporary America, "Hamiltonian means" were necessary to assure
"Jeffersonian ends" of an independent and empowered citizenry. In The
New Freedom Woodrow Wilson echoed Croly's view.25 0 Much of New
Deal lawmaking was based upon this concept, an important example
being the establishment of the system of collective bargaining that is the
cornerstone of modern American labor law.2 5'
Progressives varied in how they sought to facilitate an independent
citizenry in a modernized economy and culture. Some, notably the most
famous of all American historians, Frederick Jackson Turner, again
stressed educational opportunity as the critical basis for establishing
citizen independence in an America that no longer had a frontier that
could support the freehold concept. Building upon Turner's history,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, asserted that the end of the frontier justified
New Deal welfarism. Near the end of his long tenure as president of the
United States, and of his own life, FDR recalled the Jeffersonian
tradition of inalienable rights to justify a new list of rights necessary for
citizens living in a modernized world. In an address to Congress in 1944
he asserted: "We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true
individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and
it; the industrialization of the American economy, and related to it, the emergence of corporate
farming.
249. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 43-81 (rev. 2002).
250. Wilson wrote: "I feel confident that if Jefferson were living in our own day he would see
what we see .... Without the ...resolute interference of the government, there can be no fair play
between individuals and such powerful institutions as the trust." APPLEBY, supra note 232, at 134.
251. CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND
THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, AT 103-47 (1985).
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independence., 252 He proposed a list of new freedoms to be added to the
now inadequate freedoms embodied in the original Bill of Rights of the
Constitution. Among these included "the right to earn enough to provide
adequate food
and clothing and recreation," and the "right to a good
25 3
education. ,

The American jurisprudence of legal realism emerged
simultaneously with the New Deal. One of its important goals was to
reshape law to assure Jeffersonian independence of citizens in modern
legal transactions. This is illustrated by Morris R. Cohen's important
essay on contract law, The Basis of Contract.254 Building upon the
concern of other realist thinkers about what constituted real human
consent in contracting,2 55 Cohen attacked the classical conception of
freedom of contract, that people enjoyed liberty if they could make any
contract agreements they desired. He observed that, "mere freedom in
absence of restraint, without positive power to achieve what we deem
good, is empty and of no real value., 256 Recalling the Jeffersonian
tradition, Cohen suggested that because of disparities in bargaining
power, in the modern world negative liberty was inadequate to assure the
real freedom of contract necessary for genuine human independence.
Another major theme of legal realism that was prominent in Cohen's
article was an attack upon the distinction in classical law between public
and private activity. He observed that not only did the ability to make
contracts constitute a delegation of power to citizens, but the law
legitimately placed certain limits upon this power, to create a genuine
capacity to contract, or restrain overreaching through contracts. All of
these themes, the coalescence of public and private, the lack of real
bargaining in many contracts, and a positive view of liberty, justified
increased legal supervision of contracts and the contracting process.25 7
Twenty years after FDR called for an expanded bill of rights
Charles Reich published an important article in the Yale Law Journal. In
terms akin to Horace Mann he expressed concern that a new feudalism
would arise in modern America, in which many citizens would become

252. EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 4 n.3 (1948).
253. Id.
254. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract,46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933).
255. See generally Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923).
256. For example, Cohen believed that for the person who could not obtain a job the ability to
contract was meaningless. See generally Cohen, supra note 254.
257. The Supreme Court adopted this position in Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), when

they struck down a racially restrictive covenant in a land sale contract.
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economically servile. To avoid this eventuality required that American
law recognize a new form of property: welfare benefits.258
In the same year that Reich published his "new property" article,
Edward Bloustein argued that the "inviolate personality," referred to by
Warren and Brandeis in their landmark article on privacy law, required
the development of a more generalized law of privacy than the four
strands of common law of privacy synthesized by Dean Prosser in his
then recently-published article. 259 Bloustein argued that citizens in
modem society, lacking the protection of privacy law, were highly
subject to public scrutiny. They would therefore conform themselves to
standardized societal expectations and become purely conventional, part
of an undifferentiated mass of cloned citizens, (a fear that had been
central to Mill's essay, On Liberty, a century earlier). The development
of each person's unique moral personality would be completely stifled.
Bloustein therefore believed that privacy law was essential not only to
provide the basis of independence necessary for the development of the
human personality, but also for the necessary tolerance of individual
diversity essential to a genuinely democratic community.
The tradition of those Americans who, based upon democratic
values, have advocated for law supporting a wide diffusion of
landholding, universal public education, public benefits, and a wider
concept of human privacy, provide precedents for endowing citizens
with a human right in their genetic information. In a world that has
experienced the enormously dislocating effects of the long historical
process of modernization, in which new forms of technology in
unprecedented ways threaten citizens' control of their personal
information, and in which private eugenic efforts are resurgent;
lawmakers should endow vulnerable citizens with a human right in their
genetic information. This legal reform is essential if contemporary
America is to maintain the reality of the beautiful vision of our
ancestors, of empowered and independent citizens living in genuinely
democratic communities.

258. Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); see also Frank Michelman,
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
259. Bloustein, supra note 78.
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